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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether an appellate court can create subject matter jurisdiction by holding a party in 
contempt? 
CITATION TO OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner Ohlander's appeals by way of an unpublished 
memorandum decision. See Exhibit A. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is set forth as follows: 
a. The date of entry of decision to be reviewed is July 2, 1998. 
b. There are no petitions for rehearing or extensions of time. 
c. The Utah Supreme Court has statutory jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-2, and 3(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. The nature of the case: 
This petition is from a final order of the Utah Court of Appeals dismissing Ohlander's two 
appeals from a decree of divorce by the Fourth District Court of Utah, Hon. Anthony Schofield. 
b. The course of proceedings and disposition by other courts: 
Ohlander (mother-resident of Sweden) and Larson (father-resident of Provo, Utah) are the 
divorced parents of a daughter, Julia, who is now nearly nine years old. Julia has resided with 
Ohlander in Sweden since 1992, save for a two month period in late 1993, and early 1994. The 
divorce proceedings between Ohlander and Larson began in 1991 in Sweden. Ohlander was granted 
custody by a Swedish domestic court, and Larson was granted rights of visitation. Larson was 
unliappy with the Swedish ruling, and in November, 1993, kidnapped Julia from Sweden under the 
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guise of exercising visitation. Ohlander came to Utah, and filed a petition in January, 1994, under 
authority of the International Convention for the Recovery of Abducted Children (the "Hague" 
convention), as implemented by 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994). This case was assigned to Judge 
Bruce S. Jenkins, who entered an ex parte order that Larson return Julia to Ohlander. Judge Jenkins 
also ordered Ohlander not to leave Utah until a hearing could be held. Ohlander instead returned to 
Sweden with Julia on about February 1, 1994, and has not returned to Utah since. 
Judge Jenkins eventually heard Ohlander's petition on the merits, and concluded that Utah 
was the "habitual residence" of Julia. Ohlander appealed, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, in June, 1997, directing that Judge Jenkins' rulings be set aside, and the petition dismissed. 
Ohlander v. Larson, 114F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. den. (1997). While Ohlander's appeal was 
pending before the Tenth Circuit, Larson brought his own Hague petition before the Swedish courts. 
Larson's petition resulted in December, 1995, in a final, non-appealable ruling by the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court, that Julia was a "habitual resident" of Sweden, and that Sweden had 
jurisdiction over the custody dispute. 
While Hague petitions were pending, in both Utah and Sweden, Larson filed the instant 
divorce action, in December, 1994, in the Fourth District Court in Utah. This divorce action was 
assigned to Judge Schofield. Judge Schofield held a divorce trial, pursuant to the rulings of Judge 
Jenkins, in October, 1996. A decree was entered on May 14, 1997, awarding custody of Julia to 
Larson. Ohlander made a timely appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, and filed an appeal brief on 
October 9,1997. This appeal was based (in large part) upon Ohlander's objection to Judge Schofield 
asserting subject matter jurisdiction over Julia's custody. After the Tenth Circuit vacated Judge 
Jenkins' findings and rulings, Ohlander made a motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) to set aside the 
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divorce decree. This motion was based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Julia's 
custody, in light of the subsequent disposition by the Tenth Circuit, and the Swedish Supreme Court. 
The Rule 60(b) motion was denied in January, 1998, and Ohlander perfected a timely appeal. 
In January, 1998, Larson argued for the first time that Ohlander should be barred from 
appealing in the Utah state courts because she was in contempt of Judge Schofield's custody order. 
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed, and dismissed both Ohlander's appeals on July 2, 1998. This 
petition follows, 
c. Statement of Facts: 
Mr. Larson met Ms. Ohlander in Sweden while serving an L.D.S. mission, in 1986. (R. 45). 
Ms. Ohlander visited Mr. Larson in Utah, after his return from his mission, in 1989. (Id). The two 
were married on October 27, 1989, in South Jordan, Utah. (Findings of Fact No. 1, R. 578). Mr. 
Larson is a United States citizen, while Ms. Ohlander is a citizen of Sweden. (Id.) They established 
their marital home in Utah County, Utah. (Id.). The parties had a child, Julia, born on August 13, 
1990, in Provo, Utah. (Findings of Fact No. 4, R. 5). At the end of 1990, the parties went on 
vacation with Julia to Sweden to visit the family of Ms. Ohlander for Christmas. (Findings of Fact 
No. 11, R. 577). At the end of the visit, Ms. Ohlander decided to remain in Sweden with Julia, and 
went into hiding with Julia. (Id.) Mr. Larson eventually returned to the United States without either 
Ms. Ohlander or his daughter. (Id.) 
Ms. Ohlander commenced a divorce and custody action in the Sandviken District Court in 
Sweden on January 30, 1991. (Findings of Fact No. 12, R. 576; R. 46). Mr. Larson was served with 
process from the Swedish court, but failed to respond. (R. 37). On May 10, 1991, the Sandviken 
District Court ordered temporary custody to Ms. Ohlander, by default. (Id.; R. 391) However, over 
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the next few months, Mr. Larson persuaded Ms. Ohlander to return to Utah. Ms. Ohlander arrived 
with Julia in Utah on June 3,1991. (Findings of Fact No. 13, R. 576). The parties lived together with 
Julia in Utah until January 13, 1992, when Ms. Ohlander moved to Sweden with Julia, without Mr. 
Larson's consent. (Findings of Fact No. 14, R. 576). 
Upon her return to Sweden, Ms. Ohlander continued the prior divorce and custody action 
which had been filed in Sweden in 1991. (Findings of Fact No. 15, R. 576). Mr. Larson, who is 
fluent in Swedish (Finding of Fact No. 26, R.573), appeared in the action in Sandviken, with counsel 
provided by the Swedish Legal Aid Authority, and consented to a final divorce. (R. 40-46). He 
contested custody and visitation, but on November 13, 1992, the Sandviken District Court continued 
temporary custody in Ms. Ohlander, granting Mr. Larson "access" [visitation] for one month each 
year. (R. 43; R. 390). Mr. Larson appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeal for Southern Norrland, 
through his Swedish counsel. (R. 35-38). On January 12, 1993, the Court of Appeal ordered that 
Mr. Larson's visitation be limited to four weeks, spaced throughout the year, in Sweden only, and 
under Ms. Ohlander's supervision. (R. 35; R. 390). 
Mr. Larson exercised this visitation, under the terms of the Court of Appeal ruling, in May, 
1993. (Finding of Fact No. 20, R. 575; R. 390). The visitation in Sweden occurred during specified 
daytime hours on seven consecutive days, under Ms. Ohlander's personal supervision. (Id., R. 574). 
Sometime after this May, 1993, supervised visitation, Mr. Larson decided that the Swedish courts 
lacked jurisdiction to decide custody of Julia. (Finding of Fact No. 21, R. 574). As a consequence, 
he filed an action for divorce in Utah County in June, 1993. (Id.). Despite the fact that he had just 
been in Sweden visiting Julia in the home of Ms. Ohlander, Mr. Larson obtained an order for service 
by publication upon Ms. Ohlander on the basis that he did not know her whereabouts. (R. 54). 
7 
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Default was entered against Ms. Ohlander, and a Decree of Divorce entered on October 21, 1993. 
(Id.). 
On November, 1993, Mr. Larson, now remarried, went to Sweden to visit Julia. (Findings 
of Fact No. 24, R. 573). This visitation was again under the supervision of Ms. Ohlander, during 
specified daytime hours, and mostly in her apartment. (Id). Mr. Larson, however, was able to trick 
Ms. Ohlander, and to flee Sweden with Julia. (Id.; R. 390). Julia then lived in Utah County for the 
next two months with Mr. Larson. (Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 573). 
On January 26, 1994, Ms. Ohlander filed a petition pursuant to the Hague Convention in the 
federal district court of Utah. (Finding of Fact No. 29, R. 572).l This petition sought the return of 
Julia to Sweden pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994). Judge Bruce S. Jenkins issued an ex 
parte order directing any peace office in Utah to deliver custody of Julia to Ms. Ohlander, pending 
a hearing. (Id., R. 571-2). This order from Judge Jenkins included a direction not to remove Julia 
from Utah. In compliance with that order, Mr. Larson delivered Julia to Ms. Ohlander on January 
30, 1994. (Finding of Fact No. 30, R. 571). However, on February 1, 1994, Ms. Ohlander returned 
to Sweden with Julia. (Finding of Fact No. 31, R. 571). 
Once back in Sweden, Ms. Ohlander refused to appear again before Judge Jenkins, and as a 
result, was found in contempt on August 15, 1994. (Finding of Fact No. 32, R. 570-571). In October, 
1994, Mr. Larson filed an application with the Swedish Central Authority for the return of Julia. (R. 
645). Additionally, on December 19, 1994, Mr. Larson filed the instant divorce proceeding in Utah 
County, seeking a divorce and custody of Julia. (R. 1-3). Ms. Ohlander appeared specially, 
*See Ohlander v. Larson, 113 F.3d 1573 (10th Cir. 1997) for detailed discussion of the 
nature and purposes of a petition under the Hague convention relating to child custody disputes. 
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contesting the jurisdiction of the Utah County court to decide custody. (R. 14-17). On February 6, 
1995, the previous Decree of Divorce obtained by Mr. Larson by default was set aside and the action 
dismissed. (R. 56). 
In response to Mr. Larson's Hague application in Sweden, Ms. Ohlander moved to dismiss 
her own petition before Judge Jenkins. (R. 645). Additionally, on January 27, 1995, Mr. Larson filed 
his own Hague petition in the Swedish courts, "for the return of Julia to the U.S.A." (R. 370). Judge 
Jenkins denied Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss solely on the basis of her contempt. (R. 644). 
Judge Jenkins then conducted a bench trial on the Hague issue of "habitual residency". (Id.). On 
June 12, 1995, he entered a judgment declaring that Julia's "habitual residency" had always been in 
Utah. (R. 248, 253). He further directed the Utah County state district court to assume and 
determine custody of Julia. (R. 248, 252). Ms. Ohlander appealed to the Tenth Circuit from that 
ruling by Judge Jenkins, and sought a stay of enforcement, which he denied. (Finding of Fact 45, R. 
565). •-
On the other side of the Atlantic, on July 5, 1995, the Gavleborg County Administrative Court 
denied Mr. Larson's Hague petition. (Finding of Fact No. 43, R. 565-566; R. 231). Mr. Larson 
appealed to the Sundsvall Administrative Court of Appeal, which ailed in Mr. Larson's favor on 
August 25, 1995. (Finding of Fact No. 43, R. 565; R. 224-231). This court of appeal ordered the 
return of Julia to Mr. Larson by August 31, 1995. (Id.) However, Ms. Ohlander went into hiding, 
pending her appeal to the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court. (Finding of Fact No. 44, R. 565). 
During the Hague proceedings in Sweden, Julia was in great fear of being removed from her mother, 
relatives and school, and packed off to Utah. (Finding of Fact No. 44, R. 565; R. 408). This was 
largely due to the sudden abduction Mr. Larson perpetrated the prior November. (Id.) Published 
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accounts, which included interviews with Ms. Ohlander and Julia, graphically set forth the climate of 
fear created by Mr. Larson's prior abduction. (R. 410-418; cf. Finding of Fact No. 42, R. 566). Ms. 
Ohlander's appeal to the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court was granted, and that court ruled 
that Julia's habitual residency, at the time of her removal to the U.S.A. in November, 1993, was in 
Sweden. (R. 363-372; Finding of Fact No. 48, R. 564). This ruling was issued on December 20, 
1995. (Id). 
Meanwhile, pursuant to Judge Jenkins's ruling on habitual residency, Ms. Ohlander's counsel 
withdrew his special appearance (R. 150), and answered the complaint for divorce and custody. (R. 
181-184). This answer contained the affirmative defense that the Utah County court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the custody request. (R. 183). On September 22, 1995, Mr. Larson sought 
a temporary custody order from the court in the present case. (R. 270-271).2 Mr. Larson submitted 
an affidavit in support of his order to show cause alleging that Ms. Ohlander refused contact with 
him. (R. 266-269). This affidavit covered his attempts to see Julia while he was in Sweden in 1995 
during the Swedish Hague proceedings. (Id.) Apparently, Mr. Larson failed to seek any visitation 
relief from the Swedish district court in Sandviken. (Id.) Ms. Ohlander averred that she had never 
denied Mr. Larson his court-ordered visitation in Sweden. (R. 390). She further averred that she had 
been the primary physical caretaker of Julia since her birth. (R. 388-390). At that time, Julia was 
well-adjusted in her environment, and has a close relationship with her grandmother and other 
relatives. (R. 388). Julia attended kindergarten while Ms. Ohlander attended the university in the 
morning. (R. 389). In the afternoon, Ms. Ohlander personally provided care for Julia. (Id.) Julia 
speaks only Swedish. (Id.) Despite having been ordered to do so by the Swedish district court in 
2Ms. Ohlander's present counsel appeared on October 12, 1995. 
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Sandviken, Mr. Larson has never supported Julia financially at all. (R 388). 
In spite of the supportive and successful environment in Sweden for Julia, on February 1, 
1996, Judge Schofield issued a ruling changing temporary custody of Julia to Mr. Larson. (Finding 
of Fact No. 49, R 563; R 434-438). This assertion of child custody jurisdiction by Judge Schofield 
was based exclusively on Judge Jenkins' order. (R. 437). There was no analysis to support jurisdiction 
under the U.C.C.J.A. (Id.). Judge Schofield based his ruling changing custody to Mr. Larson in large 
part on Mr. Larson's affidavit claim that he was denied visitation, which was not ordered by the 
Swedish court. Of course, this ruling was despite the affidavit of Ms. Ohlander that she provided all 
court-ordered visitation. Ms. Ohlander did not comply with the change of custody order from Judge 
Schofield and was held in contempt. (R. 442). 
Mr. Larson sought further punishment of Ms. Ohlander, for her refusal to turn Julia over to 
him. (R. 460-461). This matter was heard on May 23, 1996. Ms. Ohlander's counsel, in response, 
made an oral motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem. (R. 462). Judge Schofield took the oral 
motion under advisement, and continued the hearing until June 11, 1996. Ms. Ohlander's counsel 
thereafter made a written request for a guardian ad litem. (R. 463-470). Judge Schofield granted 
appointment of a guardian ad litem, and ordered Ms. Ohlander's counsel to recommend local counsel 
to act in that capacity. (Finding of Fact No. 52, R. 562; R. 480). Pursuant to a request from Ms. 
Ohlander's counsel, attorney Lori Fowlke agreed to act as guardian ad litem, and she was appointed 
to act as such. (R. 482-483). At the hearing on June 11, 1996, Mr. Larson asked for telephone 
visitation. (R. 479). Judge Schofield ordered that Ms. Ohlander telephone Mr. Larson each 
Thursday at 10:00 a.m. M.S.T. (R 481). Pursuant to that order, Ms. Ohlander telephoned Mr. 
Larson for Julia at least 13 of the 19 scheduled times before trial. (Finding of Fact No. 50, R. 553). 
11 
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Ms. Ohlander's counsel arranged to have the guardian ad litem's cost funded by the Swedish 
government. (R. 496). The guardian traveled to Sweden, and personally visited Ms. Ohlander, Julia, 
and other persons in Sweden with knowledge of Julia's circumstances. (Finding of Fact No. 52, R. 
562). She prepared a detailed report to the court, submitted and received by Judge Schofield at trial. 
(Defendant's Ex. 10.; R. 551). 
Trial was held on October 18, 1996, over Ms. Ohlander's objection, and request to wait until 
after the Tenth Circuit ruled on her appeal from Judge Jenkins' order. (R. 510-518). Ms. Ohlander 
failed to appear at trial in person; however, she was represented by her counsel. (R. 552). The 
guardian ad litem, Mr. Larson and his current wife were the only witnesses. (Id.). Judge Schofield, 
predictably, found that the evidence favored Mr. Larson's claim for custody. (R. 550). On May 14, 
1997, Judge Schofield entered "canned" Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared entirely 
by Mr. Larson's counsel (R. 553-579, and a Decree of Divorce (R. 580-585). This appeal followed 
on June 13, 1997. 
Subsequent to the decree entered by Judge Schofield, the Tenth Circuit vacated Judge 
Jenkins' findings and rulings, and ordered that Ms. Ohlander's Hague petition in Utah be dismissed 
without prejudice. Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. den. (1997). As a 
result of the Tenth Circuit's ruling, Ms. Ohlander filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ P. 60(b), 
to set aside the final judgment in this case. (R. 592-595). This motion was denied by order of 
December 17, 1997, followed by a timely appeal by Ohlander. Upon motion of Larson, the Utah 
Court of Appeals conditionally dismissed the appeal from the original custody ruling, and the denial 
of Rule 60(b) relief on July 2, 1998. When Ohlander declined to reinstate her appeal by compliance 
with the decree, the appeals were unconditionally dismissed, Exhibit A hereto. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT FOR CERTIORARI 
Certiorari is appropriate for the following reasons: 
The Court should direct the Court of Appeals to hear and decide the question of subject 
matter jurisdiction over this international custody dispute. Even though Ohlander refused to obey 
Judge Schofield's custody ruling, if there was no subject matter jurisdiction, there is no contempt. 
The Court of Appeals dodged prior rulings of this Court, and of its own panels, in dismissing 
Ohlander's appeals without deciding the question of its jurisdiction. 
Unless review is granted, and the jurisdictional standoff resolved, Utah will stand at odds with 
the rulings of the United States federal courts, and the courts of Sweden. The Tenth Circuit was very 
concerned about avoiding conflicting rulings from Sweden and Utah. Apparently, the Utah Court 
of Appeals was not very worried about the interests of federalism or international comity. 
A child's future is caught in a jurisdictional "Gordian Knot", as the Tenth Circuit put it, and 
this Court is the last court that can untie that knot. While the interests of the parties, and States, and 
countries are at issue, the court should recognize that ultimately it is the interest of Julia, a child not 
before the court, that is at stake. It is ironic that the Tenth Circuit panel all agreed that it was an abuse 
of discretion to decide this case based solely on Ohlander's contempt. The irony is only heightened 
when one considers that Larson has appeared and appealed freely in the Swedish courts, despite his 
non-compliance with their orders. 
The court should consider the limits that may appropriately be imposed, in cases where a 
child's custody is in dispute, upon the doctrines of Von Hake v. Thomas, 881 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) and D 'Aston v. D 'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), which bar a contemptuous 
party's appeal. This is an issue that merits consideration for the guidance of trial courts, appellate 
13 
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courts, and practitioners in the domestic area. Given the ever-increasing mobility of our society, these 
situations are bound to recur, and cause unnecessary cavil in the lower courts unless they are sorted 
out by this Court. 
The specific relief requested is two-fold: for this Court to directly hear and determine subject 
matter jurisdiction or to direct the Utah Court of Appeals to hear and decide the appeal as to subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
1. Contempt of Court Does Not Create Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
A defect in subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even after being held in 
contempt: 
. . .while defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived, subject matter jurisdiction 
goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action. A lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. A lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when subject matter 
jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to 
fill the void. 
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173-74 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 
726 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted))(emphasis added). Nothing can be done by the parties to 
fill the subject matter jurisdiction void, not even by contumaciously ignoring the proceedings. 
Otherwise, a trial or appellate court could create subject matter jurisdiction through the contempt 
process, in direct violation of the holding of Crump. 
When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its proceedings are null and void: "[sjince the 
entire proceedings before the circuit court were conducted absent jurisdiction, they are a nullity and 
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are void, [citations omitted]". Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Once the lack of subject matter jurisdiction was pointed out, the trial court had no alternative but to 
dismiss. It could not proceed further, to require Ms. Ohlander to deliver custody to Mr. Larson, or 
to hold her in contempt. "Upon a determination by the Court that its jurisdiction is lacking, its 
authority extends no further than to dismiss the action, [citation omitted]. . . . It was improper for the 
court to proceed in this matter other than by dismissal. " Thompson v. Jackson, at 1232. An order 
of contempt issued by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void, and subject to attack on 
appeal. Hammond v. Wall, 171 P. 148 (Utah 1917)(an order exceeding a court's jurisdiction is void, 
and no contempt is committed by disobeying it); In Re Rogers' Estate, 284 P. 992, 997 (Utah 
1930)("A failure to comply with a void judgment is not contempt"). See also 17 Am, Jur.2d §148, 
"Contempt", p. 504-505, "A court cannot punish as contempt a violation of an order beyond the 
court's power or jurisdiction". 
Other courts have held that a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction cannot hold a party 
in contempt. See State v. Thomas, 550 So.2d 1067, 1070 (Ala. 1989)("in order to hold a person in 
contempt, a court must have jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter"); State v. Barker, 
425 P.2d 753 (Or. 1967)(order of contempt for failing to deliver custody of child void because issuing 
court lacked jurisdiction over the suit); In Re Estate o/Steinfeld, 630 N.E.2d 801 (111. 1994)(unless 
order is void, court with subject matter jurisdiction may enforce orders by contempt); In Re Kramer, 
75 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1956)(lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by party held in 
contempt). 
2. This Court Must Determine If It (And The Trial Court) Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
The trial court had an independent obligation to determine whether it had subject matter 
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jurisdiction. This court has a similar obligation: 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to determine a 
controversy and without which it cannot proceed. Without jurisdiction over the 
subject matter alleged in plaintiffs claims, the court was without authority to proceed 
or to enter any adjudication on the merits of the claims The fundamental and 
initial inquiry of a court is always to determine its own jurisdictional authority over 
the subject matter of the claims asserted. The trial court should have examined its own 
jurisdictional limitations at the time plaintiff sought the initial default judgment and 
dismissed the action. . . . Even in the absence of a proper objection, the issue should 
have been raised on the court's own motion. Upon its failure to raise the issue, we are 
obligated to do so. [citations omitted]. 
Thompson v. Jackson, at 1232. An appellate coui t l"iiu,i divide a queslinn <tl Mib|o1 iiialihii 
jurisdiction where it appears on the face of the record." Western Capital & Sec, Inc v Knudsen, 
768 P.2d 989, WS (Utah t I A|'p 1 < W)»( quolni^ (\im\uhers v. Carreathers, <^* s *  Colo. 
Ct. App. 1982). Accord, Transworld Systems, Inc v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The D 'Aston v. D 'Aston opinion, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and the cases that 
followed it, all rest upon the assumption that the trial coi n 11 lad ji m isdiction, to IA 1 licl i the appellant 
could be forced to submit. In none of those cases was the personal jurisdiction of the trial court 
questional I"1" !|iliiiii,i11' \W suh|C( I inalln PJII'HIH IIMII nl lln 111ill court to even enter the orders 
subsequently disobeyed. For instance, the D 'Aston court held that "[appellant] must submit herself 
to the jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy that court's concerns before she may exercise that 
right [to appeal]." Id. at 594. Hen flu iiiuill u mil ILK! HO ,iiti|ai imitlri luiisdiclmii \\ \\ I in h JVls. 
Ohlander needed to submit. To force the appellant in this case to submit to the jurisdiction of the trial 
u ml wink! jsMiiir ilhc ullimnk' iii'viill nil llllit" merits, i e , subject matter jurisdiction, under the guise 
of enforcing a contempt order. This is logically absurd. 
The appeal brief of Ms. Ohlander points out in more detail why the trial court lacked subject 
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matter jurisdiction. That argument is incorporated herein. Nowhere in the memorandum decision of 
the Court of Appeals is there a finding of subject matter jurisdiction This Court should order the 
Court of Appeals and the trial court to specifically rule on that issue, after allowing Ohlander to brief 
and argue that jurisdictional issue. 
3. This Court Should Exercise Its Discretion To Hear This Case, Because of the Interests Of 
Third Parties, Including Sweden and Julia 
The Court of Appeals assumed that D 'Aston and Von Hake applied in this case, and that 
dismissing the appeal was necessary. D 'Aston and Von Hake actually do not mandate a dismissal of 
an appeal in every case: 
D'Aston [I] affirms the court's discretionary authority to dismiss the appeals of 
contumacious litigants under terms which are fair and just given the circumstances of 
a particular case. Under D'Aston [I], a court has the discretion to determine what 
is a reasonable approach in dealing with a contumacious litigant who, even while 
disregarding the judiciary's contempt process, nonetheless wishes to avail himself or 
herself of judicial procedures thought to be beneficial. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 881 P.2d 895, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This court should exercise that 
discretion to defer consideration of contempt until it has determined whether the trial court had 
subject matter jurisdiction in the first place to issue orders requiring Ms. Ohlander to deliver custody 
to Mr. Larson. There are several reasons for this approach. 
Most importantly, this court has an obligation to consider the effect of the opinion of the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The exercise of child custody jurisdiction in this case was based 
solely upon Judge Jenkins' finding of habitual residency. The Tenth Circuit set that finding aside. 
There was no other basis for child custody jurisdiction. Judge Schofield elevated Judge Jenkins over 
the Tenth Circuit when he refused to consider the effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision on his 
exercise of child custody jurisdiction. However, the Tenth Circuit was well aware of Ms. Ohlander's 
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contempt when it issued its opinion. Consideration of the Tenth Circuit's opinion leaves the clear 
im ' s s i i ^e thai ill i i t i n i i Jn l oiilv nunc p i o r m l m j . ' h i defci i i i i i ic chi ld < mslodv and tha i I ha t p r o c e e d i n g 
would be in Sweden. To suggest that the Tenth Circuit expected its opinion to be set at naught by 
fin JfVitf ee court invites an accusation of contempt of the federal courts. 
In a related vein, the Swedish Supreme Court has already i i ilecl that it has ji 11 isdictioi i I I lis 
is a final, non-appealable ruling, binding on both parties. This court should carefully consider whether 
it has subject iiiiiflii (UNSIIH Iinti I d o i r sctihuic, ilsd'l .il o d d * u i l l i lllm l ega l s y s t e m o f a n o t h e r country . 
Second, it avoids the logical absurdity of assuming the ultimate result, jurisdiction, under the 
guise of preserving the authority of the court. Third, it avoids determining custody by default. The 
long-settled environment of Julia, the child of the parties, shoult I in I he d i s i u p l c d b e t a u M 1 Iici H I H I I H I 
refuses to concede jurisdiction in a foreign country, in order to oppose that jurisdiction. Fourth, the 
i 'I iin I s h o u l d iin! i c n a i d I\ In I ai soi i s coi itempt of tl ic Swedish courts by refusing to allow Ms. 
Ohlander to oppose subject matter jurisdiction in the United States. 
Finally, dismissing the appeal without considering the merits would consign Julia and the 
parties to a jurisdictional purgatory, where the questioi: i of I Itah's ji u isdictioi i is pe i petuall) held in 
limbo. This would not be in anyone's best interests, including Mr. Larson's. Because of the unique 
1 in tiinsfiiiiecs in llii'i c a w d i smis sa l ill llir a p p e a l n n u k l Lie the w r o n g so lu t ion . Ins tead , t h e a p p e a l 
should be heard on its merits. If Judge Schofield is ultimately found to have jurisdiction to have 
entered Ilis contempt orders, there will be time enough at that point to consider sanctions. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The sum and substance of this case is that Utah lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
child ciisictd) cast I1* H dial ira.'vi mi ludge Schofield lacked jurisdiction to proceed, by ordering Ms. 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ohlander to deliver Julia to Mr. Larson, and lacked jurisdiction to hold her in contempt for failing to 
do so. This defect in the proceedings is so fundamental that even contempt of court cannot salvage 
the situation. Further, the interests of another sovereign nation, and a little child are also at stake. 
To muzzle the mother for simply honoring the legal process of her own country would be unjust to 
her, her country and to Julia. 
The Court of Appeals dodged the issue of subject matter jurisdiction entirely, basing its order 
of dismissal solely on Ohlander's contempt and refusal to purge that contempt. This avoids the prior 
doctrine of this Court, and of the Court of Appeals as well. A writ of certiorari should issue to 
determine whether Utah courts have jurisdiction over this child custody dispute. 
DATED this b day of August, 1998. ' ' " " / 
/^ ^ - - ^ x < 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Kevin K. Robson 
Attorneys for Ohlander 
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copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, by depositing copies thereof 
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FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAIt.S 
ooOoo 
Mark Andrew Larson, 
Plaint iff and Appe11e e 
JUL 0 2 1998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Karin Sofia Ohlander, 
Defendant an i Appellant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 970375-CA 
Case No. 980054-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u l y 2 , 1998) 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield 
Attorneys Daniel F. Bertch and Kevin K. Robson, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Brian C. Harrison, Provo, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood. & 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Karin Sofia Ohlander appeals from a divorce decree 
in Case No. 970375-CA (the "first appeal") and from an order 
denying a motion to set aside the divorce decree in Case No. 
980054-CA (the "second appeal"). 
Appellee Mark Andrew Larson sought dismissal of the first 
appeal pursuant to D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) based upon Ohlander's contempt through failure to 
comply with the district court's orders and decree. This court 
granted Larson's motion to dismiss, subject to Ohlanderfs 
satisfaction of specified conditions that would allow the first 
appeal to continue. Larson now seeks dismissal of the second 
appeal on the same basis. 
This court has consistently held that an appellate court 
possesses "discretionary authority to dismiss the appeals of 
contumacious litigants under terms which are fair and just given 
the circumstances of a particular case." Von Hake v. Thomas, 
881 P.2d 895, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In its order of April 
14, 1998, this court conditionally granted the motion to dismiss 
the first appeal. The court required that, in order to continue 
her appeal, "appellant Karin Sofia Ohlander shall comply with the 
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I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 1998, a true and correct 
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deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed below: 
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Fourth District Court 
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SANDVIKEN DESiaiCr COURT MINUTES OF PSEUMXKABY 
HEAIING 
in Saadvjkca on 
2nd November 1S92 
T 32/91 
Amsx: 30 
THECOUBT 
Deputy Diarist Judge Joisn Alvner 
SEBRES. OF THE MINUTES 
Law Ckdc Marianas Lmdholm 
fHIlllUNER 
Karin SOFIA I !"•"", nai. res* 20- 671Q29-75C5, Grundbogaian 1 E, 
S-S1X 30 SANDVIKEN; present in perns 
Legal representative: Anita Wallin-Wlberg. Ancmsy-at-law, Box 1322, 
S-801 38 SAKDVTKEN: present 
RESPONDENT 
MARK Andrew Larson, b. 6.11.65, cf 69 E fit • Jtth. 84606. USA; 
put nut in person 
Legal rearssenorive: 3engt Heraex. Atamey-si.law, Box 244, S-811 23 
SANDVlkBN; present 
CAUSE 
Dtanfnricm of marriage etc 
Bcngt Hennei subsrioed Mark Lassen's application for legal aid. Annex 31, and 
staxsd as follows. Mark was rinrnicirri m Swedes for tbent one year at tte age 
of six or seven and then between 1985 and 1987. He carmnr af&sd to retain 
wywyrl in Sweden cm of hi* own pocket and mere ate special grounds for 
awarding him legal aid. 
Anita WalHaWIherg, y—— t Sofia Lancn'i peine of claim, stated u fcllcwi. 
Sofia Larson prays the District Court to sake a decree abtotam of divorce 
batwesn me pardea by part-judgement and, also on an uunlnumuy basis* to 
award net sole custody of taeir daughter Julia and to order Mark La ram to pay 
her, unuunseatscs for tb« daughter, SEK L075 montniy for tn« period between 
1st January ami 3 lit May 1991 andSEK 1,125 monthly from 15tb January 1992 
and axil tea child is 18 yuus old. 
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TTTTvmtsnnncc ciabns. For his own part* also on an xntcitxmory basil, Mark 
Lanran m thf first instance ciaixas eartDriy of the daughter, Julia, and pays that 
Sofia. ianou be ordered tn piy hia. ai roauzesance fhr their daughter, SEK 
1,(173 rconthly from the day ot tne D i a n e Courts ascpoiiiy artier in c s xnamr 
until the rigyghtrf is 12 ycui old, u £ ts itxs iccsnd instances, in the etas or 
Sofia being awarded cuawly of Julia, icegss tD dieir daughter in the USA for two 
waonucu* T™*"* annually for the period between 1993 and 1997 u d six weeka 
annually thOTaftfiT. M a i * I IftOn CfiafinSS Julia's need o f SUSSSntZXC 2t thfi 
standard rate of SEK 1,075 monthly and his own ability 7) pay maintenance. In 
the event of enatnoy of the A™?***? r^nj awarced to Sofia Larson. Mark has 
discharged M* ^ mr^ncgnhf^innn fbr ihs period gremlins 13th January 1952. 
Anna Wallln Wibcrg stated a* folic v s . Sofia Larson cemm the custody and 
TrsfmimTiM claims. Julia's need of mainrrnsres is r.nnnrnirrt, bat Sofia Lanon 
does Mt hive the fiifannnnc resoarce* tn pay TnaTrurasrcx As regards the nuiody 
claim. Sofia T arson COSKSU to Mirk Larson being firm ax opponuxsry of 
saws to the child, bur not to the extsut clataesd and iad in the USA. 
Anita WaHin Wxhert sratrri -further as fallows. Scfia Laou sua Mark Ijuictu 
ox the Chnrcn of Jesus Chriit of Latter-Day Saints, in 1986, 
while be w u living in Sweden. Sofia visited Mart in tfte USA in 1989 and the 
cnupie wens mimed in October i989. They settled in the USA and their rtamghtrr 
Julia was born in August 1990. AAcr coiobratina Chrivffim in Sweden, Sofia 
H*t»v4M tn rymiiw frgpg ^ 4 fo larrtittry 1 9 9 1 pTTTOOCd fttt 1 dJVOIM. Itt July 1 9 9 1 
Sofia returned to Mark in the USA in a bid to uve their carriage! but tfc* 
relationship was iixepsrablt. Sofia considrn Mark temperamental and uncoe* 
trolled. He has a violent temper and has hit and Wcked Sofia in Julia's pa inm. 
Safta does not wisn tn leave Marie alone with JUlla and tears thai Mark could 
Kidnap Julia sen taks her 10 the USA. Mart's saeresi in Julk las grown sines 
Sufi* brought their dsngntrr ts Swtoca. flerwesu July 1991 and January 1992, 
when Sofia and Julia wtxe living with Mark in the USA. there was a lot oi 
quarrelling and Sofia was forced to leave the USA without telling Mark: ia 
advisee. gn«H«*»f up, it is Sofia who, ever sznee Julia « u born, has been 
mainly responsible for her sad is best suited to loot ater her. John castody U not 
feasible and ii is in Julia's ben uuereau for Sofia LO be awarded sole custody of 
her. 
Bengt Henssl stated as fellows. Sofia 1*& the USA ia November 1990. I: was 
agreed that Mark should join her and that they were to crteftntn Chrinnia* with 
Softs'* fzmdy in ^WCOCCL Sofia's idanvea persuaded ner to scay on in SwedOL 
and Made wu iiccnily ilsuwn uutby tier raffiUy. Evidsody one of Sena's nunica 
fr***y*+ had phoned* aayi^ that Mark inTffnrlrd to Iridmp Jullat which was a 
nrrj^i^m UboatncaL Wfaca Sofia axsd Julia returned to the USA in the summer 
ftf 1491. fiverymine went well to besin with. Olt in November 1991 ths 
dp detJobotatBd uA Sofia xssuxaod to Sweden without telling Maxk first. 
Jusiry tod J u s 1991, Mnrk contributed towards Julia's upkeep by 
lafix SEK 5T500, Mark hsa a monthly ircunie of SEX. 12,100 (SEK. 
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1Q,4Q0 an). Mark used to hive his own flat, but he is sow living with his 
granomotber. Merle works in the optcs industry and has pienry of scope for 
working overtime; this entities him to time off, over and above the regular two 
weeks' paid holiday. If Juli* cornea to the USA, Mirk can work hstf-dme and 
look after fasr «i«rmg his leisure. A brother, with a Swedish wife, and three 
minied cousins iiYe in the satnc cir/f and so Mark has pienry of help available 
for locking after Julia- While in Sweden Mark haa been allowed to mestJtxlit far 
about 1Q hours, always hi the yitsrae? of Sofia and her relatives. Sofia has no 
grounds whatsoever for denying ^i™ normal access to their daughter, and with 
Sofia's ^tiFrtt to the r1**^ of access, ft is Made who is best suited for custody 
of Julia. Mark is aware that a child needa both in parents and Sofia would be 
given pienry of opportunity for regular access to Julia. If Sofia is awarded custody 
of fheir rfmghter and Mark access, **»*»", while Julia is still too until to travel on 
her own, Mark will coxnc to Sweden and coiled Julia and will then bring her 
back to Sweden. 
Anita Wallin Wiberg rated as follows. Sofia h^M sot received any financial 
•ffffftw* towards Julia's upkeep. Co the other ftana she has received money 
towards her miephnxm bill and towards the cost of forwarding luggage. As regards 
the risk of kidnapping, Sofia's g^^e^ of recovering her qtuswrr if Mark should 
keep her in the USA are fairly nan-existent. Sofia ia currently unemployed* She 
previously bid a temporary tMrfwig job and ix now wailing to hear whether she 
has been accepted for a study programme she hai applied for. 
Bengt Ken&ei stated as fallows. Marx Larson confirms that Sofia Larson is 
unemployed. 
Sofia Larson stamd as follows. While she wss jiving in the USA. Mark had 
outbursts of rage and thrxrw things, ofiea without her being able to understand 
why. Mark has struck hsr and occasionally aiso kicked her. They differed on 
many maaenu e.g. religion and child education. She returned to the USA because 
she wanted the relationship to work, but it would act. Mark has never been 
vioknr to Julia and now that they have met in Sweden things have gone well. 
Sefia dng» net Imnw wtefliyr t\\e fett «f kr*faeping WM in ffinipff, buishedoea 
not trust Mark. Mark «h<^H be allowed access to Julia but shnnlri not be allowed 
to take her to the USA until Julia ia older. 
Mark Larson stated aa follow*. He has always cared about Julia, but distance baa 
made it hard to keep in touch with her. Previously Sofia alio prevented hhn from 
™iir»wg to Julia en the phone. The relanaoihip between Hitw<g*f and Sofia broke 
down and s**fla waa depraaed* felt bad and would not speak co her friends or 
even meet thsm. There wnre two occaakms when he ' struckJ Sofia. One of them 
was a purely reflex movement against Sofia's leg, and the second time waa a blow 
which struck her on the cheek when she "exploded" in the car. Sofia can not have 
been injured on either of theae occasions. He has never kirkflri her and never 
anything at her or in such a way that there was a risk of her being struck. 
taiv of kidnapping ia quits groundless. On the contrary, he has told her 
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that ha would ncvtr go off with Julia the way Sofia, did when she rock Julia aM 
left the USA without calling Urn first. Sofia sad Julia have a good relationship 
and he wants it to contrmT If h^  is awarded custody, Julia will be ailowea to 
visit Sofia in Sweden. 
Anita Wallin Wibcxg stated a* follows. Sofia Larson conwraa to Marie Larson 
berg allowed accrsi to Julia three tunes a year for one week at a time. Access 
may be exercised In Sofia* i home or in some odier place on which the partita can 
agree, but not in the USA. 
Anita Wallin Wiberg claimed remuneranou in ararrnfanne with an expense 
irrwmt, Annex 31, auhmiocd. 
Tie proceedings having lasted from 11 a ^ to 12.25 p.m., were declared closed 
with the announcement that a part-judgement and order would be made by being 
made available in the Dittnct Coun Office on 13th November 1992 at 2 p.m. 
Retiring to chambers, the Dinner Ccuxt made a part-judgement ana the following 
ORDER (to be issued on i3th November 1992 at 2 p.m.). 
Until such time as these matters have been detenrinad by a judicial decision 
having force of law or by a decision to the contrary, the District: Court aiders 
u follows. 
1. dismay of TITLIA Snfi*. nar, reg, Tin. 9QDB13-33ZS, Rhall cotsiSSfi m he 
vested in Sofia Larson . sa ordered by the Diane: Court in its temporary 
order atlOfe May 1991. 
2. The District Court finds no cause to amend its temporary order cf 1 Oth May 
1991 in the maner cf ^ * ^ ^ ^ r * . , which order shall accordingly remain in. 
force. 
3. Mark Larson shall be ****** to acceu to the daughter. Julia* for one 
y*tmr*t in the year, at a d*^ to be agreed on in detail tecrweeu the names. 
Anita Wallin Wiberg is awarded an advance payment of SEX 9,S5Q under the 
Legal Aid Act. In view of the rxilea concerning p a y n ^ thia 
entire amount «***» be disbursed out of public funds. 
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Any appeal tpisst this order ihaii t * made sepiraieiy, by limited appeal not 
later than 4th December 1992. 
Date as above, 
(Sgiumat:) 
Marianne Lindholm 
Recast read and approved/ (Initials) 
(Stamp:) 
SANDVIKEN DISTRICT COURT 
For a true copy, 
(Slgnctiurej 
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THE COURT OF APPEAL RECORD OF HEARING 
FOR SOUTHERN NORRLAND ia Sondavail on 
:3tb.D«cBmber 1992 
sag 
Aansx: 1C 
6 1180/92 
THE COURT 
- Chaster Berg, Appellate Caet Judge 
Gflit* Grefcerg, Appellate Court Judas Referee ' 
Xrama Bracefagrg, A o c g Appellate Ccuit Judge 
KWWUWU O F THB MINUTES 
The Refines 
VARIOUSLY APPELLANT AND OPPONENT (not present) 
Karia SOFIA Linen, OIL reg. no. 671029-7505.' Plangatan 4 C, 
S-Sll 29 SANDVTKEH 
Legal rcpresemariVB and counsel uiaier the Legai Aid Act: Anita Wailin Wiberg, 
Attetoey-at-Uw, Box 1333. S-S01 38 GAVLE 
VARIOUSLY APPELLANT AND OPPONENT {act present) 
MABS Andrew r«rtm1 b. 6.11.65, ddzsa of the United States of America, 69 
E 600 N Prove, Utah 84606, USA 
Legal representative and counsel usder the Legal AM Ace Eengt fffrmrt, 
ABorney-at-iaw, Box 244. S-811 23 SANDVIKEN 
CAUSE 
Temporary order ccssersrng right of acceia to child es . 
TEBnHlflN UONTUSlfaD 
Made by the Sasdviken District Ccun on 13th November 1992 in cue no. T 
33/91. 
The case hging ptssascd by Trainee Denary Judge Sten Ekstrand, the Court of 
Appeal noted as follow*. 
In her application of 30th January 1991 far a -writ of smnTnnni against Made 
Larson. Sofia T ar**" prayed, the District Cater TD asks a Hmrn •twnhtte of 
divorce Between them and. also an an mxriocsrnry basis, to award her caatody 
.. ... _ ^ .of their child JULIA Sorla.nac.rcg. no. 900813-3929. and to order Mark farton 
/ ^ " ^ A^J^smpay SEX 1,078 mahssasnee monthly for their dragster, with crxset riom 2Sxh 
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January 1991 asd until die child is 18 yean oid, accrued amounts to be paid 
frnraKtiaffiy and snhsrqnrflt nmnuTiTi in advance of each calendar manm* 
Mark Lazson having been served with the suasions application and a special 
iejuisa inn bur noticing having been heard from him thereafter, die Disrnci Court, 
on iOfli May 1991 and until such tunc as these questions were derided by a 
judgcznenr having force of law or pending decision to the contrary, the District 
Court nude an order in accordance wiih.Sofia Larson's points of claim in the 
my|PTf of custody flrrf wt^ynn!icf'i thmigfr without i^ i^ing tH^ f accrued 
amounts of maintenance vrcre to be paid immediately. 
At & preliminary hearing on 2sd November 1992. Sc^Laaon prayed the District 
Court to make a decree absolute of divorce between the parnes by paix-judgcmcnt 
and. also, on an interiocumry basis, tn swam her sole custody of their ^ugim— 
Julia and to order Mark Lanon to pay her, as mamiecance for their daughter, 
3E£ 1,075 monthly for the period between 1st January and 31st May 1991 
inchudvi, and SE£ 1,125 monthly as from 15th January 1992 and until the child 
is 18 years eld. Mark Larson cunsetucri to the divorce claim but causssd the 
custody and ^ itntgng™^ claims. He confirms SE3C 1,075 per monxh ai reasonable 
tnaimsnanffc but claimed that he had discharged his nwhTenancc obligation fcr the 
period preceding 15tii January 1992. For his own pin. also on an insriecatory 
basis, ha claimed, in the first instance, sole custody of the riattghtrr and 
maintenance for her. In the second instance, in the event of Sofia Larson being 
awardad custody of the daughter, Mark Larson also on an interlocutory basis, 
prayed that ho be awarded right of access to the daughter for two continuous 
months per annum between 1993 and 1997 and for six weeks pear annum 
thereafter, custody to be exercised in the USA. Sofia T arson contested Mark 
Larson1! custody and maimmanca claims. As regards the custody claim. Sofia 
Larson T^pfgrrri to Mark Larson being enridnd to access to the child three times 
annually fcr one wee* at a time, the access to be exercised in her hems or in 
soma other place on which the parcel were able to agree, but not in the USA. 
On 13th November 1992, p8™*™!! the deteroutianon of these matters by a 
jrn»^ i mil iiu...|i fr*vm-ryf-i*m or rtrriiinn m rhr ;inntiary, the District Coin 
ordered as toilowi: 
(1) Custody of the ^sMgir^ of the parries, Julia, shall continue, as ordered by 
tl» District Court m its temporary order of 10th May 1991, to be vested in 
Sofi* Larson. 
(2) The District Ccun flreis no cause to amend its temporary onler of 10th May 
1991 in the ™«™-«»of maintenance* which order shall accordingly remain In 
fore. • • 
(3) Mark Larson ?b<ril be entitled to access to the daughter, Julia, for one 
*- V "jkuirrT"^  mash in the year, at a time to be agreed on m. detail between the parties. 
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In its pan-judgement of L3th November 1992, the Diitrx: Court marie a decree 
absolute of divorce between the parties. 
Sofia, ^ w n an: Mark Larson have filed scparzie appeal against the District 
Corn's cnicr of 13ch November 1992, and ia doing 50 presented the following 
point* of claim. 
Sella Larson has prayed the Coon of Appeal to set Mark Lanoa's rignt of 
temporary acceai to their faiigflrcr Julia at one week during the autumn term, one 
naqgfr rfrwwj nfrg gprirg ***** *"° ""*» ^g^g in ***^  aummgr mrmrh*. She baa ftahCT 
stipulated that the acceas ahall take place hi her home or in another place in 
Sweden which ihs may ^ l f g t l > , that access say not be exerciaed during the 
Christmas and New Year holiday and on.no position in the USA, and that the 
time of acceai shall be decided two week* in advance of each occaahm, with 
Mark Larson notifying her of hia wishes. 
Mark Larson has prayed the Conn of Appeal to award him right of temporary 
access m the ***"gtffgr of the paxtea, Julia, in the USA for a period of two 
continuous mnr^^ annua tiy, subject to hia being obliged, not leas than one month 
before the t o e when he Wmfr access to begin, to notify Sena Larson according-
ly, and also to set his temporary maintenance obligation to Sofia. Larson at SEK 
1,075 monthly a* from lith January 1992T payable in advance of each «!»*«*•» 
month. 
Sofia Larson and Maxk Lanon have comestsd each other's amendment claina. 
The Court of Appeal makes the following 
FINAL ORDER 
In view of the child's age and other circumstances, it is appropriate that Mark 
Larson's rights of temporary srrrti to the daughter. Julia, should be defined as 
referring to access in Sweden and should mainly bo arranged in accordance with 
Sofia Lanoa's pcasinn to Court of AppcaL 
In the miner of ™»™f«**»™^ it follow* from the provisions of Chap. 7, Sfcrioa 
LS of the Code of Pares&ood and Guardianship that a temporary mainteaaoet 
order can it any nose be amended by the Court aa regards the ongoing mainten-
ance obligation, whereas reappraisal of such an order, with resosctive effect, 
shall not take place "**+* the case has been determined. Thus the rtrcision 
conrntfd shall be deemed to comprise Mart Larson's obligation, for the period 
from 13th November 1991 until the child is 13 years old, to pay SHS 1,078 
maintenance monthly for the *m$p*T in advance of each calendar month. The 
Court of Appeal fuadj no euue for am 11 ruling cbs order reus mad*. 
Av^ .With TBfr f^jt^  to the above, the Court of Appeal amends the cammed decision 
^3aofar aa me Court of AppcaL p^^^g the dasmnination of the maser by judicial 
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decision or an enter hiving gained fores of law, or pending decision to toe 
contrary, orders ttiir Mart L inm shall hxve a right of access to the riiuigtim of 
the pomes, Juik Sofia, not. rcg. no. 900813-3929, for one week between toe 
months of January and May, twojveoa between ±omon±a of June acdAaguK 
and one -week before the months of Scprernher and December, though act daring 
I the Chriatmti ox New Year holiday. Acceu may <airj be eawciscd in Sweden, 
at a place designated by Sofia. Larson and at the exact does which, Mark Larson 
1 having apprised Sofia Larson of hh pic:crcacesf have been decided two 'weeks in 
\ tdvance of every occasion. 
For serriccs rendered in the Coon of Appeal p:occsritngtt The Coon of Appeal 
awards Ansa W&Uin Wtberg 3EK 1.7S0 and Bsngt Kennel SESL 2.670 u 
rernuneranon under the Legal Aid Act. 
Tssnoscnnss FOR APPEAL 
Any appeal lgniait the vir**ftf jt—rTprvritm ** Af,<Ta Wtiifawihgf* a«a Wj-wp 
HT*"»»* shall be cade, by limited anpeaL not lxer man Tuesday, 9th Febmary 
1993. 
Under Chap. 20, Section 12(3) of the Code of Parenthood and Guirniarabip, no 
appeal can be r"ttH» against die Conn of Appeal's decision on otter respects. For 
ttUtrnctians f^ Trnrnirg proseconm of appeal proceedings, see enclosure. 
(Signature:) 
Keeper of the Misues 
Record read and approved 12.1.1993/(2Mttabj 
Given 12m January 1993 
(Stmta.'i 
COURT OF APPEAL FOR 
SOUTHERN NORRLAND 
For a true copy i 
(Signature) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
} 
TabD 
I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
V 
5." 
j 
SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
OTJDGHSNT Case no. 
4S36-199S 
delivered in Scockholra on Decerrber 20, 1295 
COMPLAINANT 
Sofia Ohlander, personal identification no. 671C29-
7505, of Piangatan 6 C, 811 39 Sandviken 
Representative and counsel under the Legal Aid Act: 
Anita Wallin tfiberg, Attcrney-at-law, Advokatfiman 
Hahne & Co, Box 1333, 801 33 GAvle 
OPPOSITE PAXTY 
Marfc parson, date of birth Ncvember 3, 1955, of 636 
South S50 Ease, Oreiri, Utah 84C58, USA 
Representative and counsel under the Legal Aid Act: 
?redric Rens tron, Attomey-at-law, 3irger Jarlsgatan 
13, 
111 45 Stockholm 
XBVEIOJ AGAINST A COURT DECISION 
Judgment delivered by Sundsvali Administrative Court 
of Appeal on August 25, 1955 in case no. 2513-1995 
(Annex) 
MATTER 
Return of a child pursuant to the Act (1989:14) 
concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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DEMANDS ETC • 
Sofia Ohlander demands chat the Supreme 
administrative Court alter the judgment c£ the 
Administrative Court of Appeal, dismissing Mark 
Larson's suit and withdrawing that judgment* She 
also demands that the Supreme Administrative Court 
shall obtain information/a report from the social 
welfare committee in'Sundsvall about Julia!s present 
home conditions and that this report should be 
completed with a report from the Children's and 
Adolescents' Psychiatric Clinic for the purpose of 
establishing how the child has adjusted to Sweden -
and whether returning her would entail serious risks 
co her mental or physical health. In support of her 
suit in respect of the return of Julia, Sofia 
Ohlander has adduced the following. After her birth 
Julia has resided in Sweden ever since November/ 
1990, with the exception of seven months during 1991 
and two months at the turn of 1993/1994. Mark Larson 
tcck the law into his own hand3 when he fetched l 
Julia in November, 1393. In 1992 and 1993 Mark -
Larson took parr in the Swedish custody proceedings, 
thus accepting Swedish jurisdiction. In view of 
Sofia Ohlanderls intension of remaining in Sweden 
with Julia and the length of time that Julia has 
spent in Sweden, her adjustment to this country and 
Hark Larscn's passivity, it must be concluded that 
in February, 1594 Julia's habitual residence was 
Sandviken. 
Mark Larson contests the granting of the appeal and 
the demand that the Supreme Administrative Court 
arrange for further investigation in the case. In 
support cf his suit he has adduced the following. He 
has never accepted that Julia should live in Sweden. 
nor that Sofia Ohlander should have custody of her. 
Julia was residing in the USA in January/February, 
1994 when Sofia Shlarider unlawfully abducted h*r. 
Subsequently, Sofia Ohlander a&s prevented all 
contacts between him and Julia, 
In its decision of August 30, 1995 th<* Supremo 
Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of 
the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal 
with regard to the return of Julia. 
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REASONS TOR THE SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT'S 
DECISION 
The evidence in the case has established the 
following facts. Mark Larson and Sofia Ohlander were 
married en October 21. 1989 in the USA and their 
daughter Julia was born there on August 13, 1990. 
The fairily went to Sweden in Ncvember, 1990, after 
which Mark Larson returned to the USA alone in the 
beginning of January, 1591. That same month Sofia 
Ohlander filed a petition for divorce and sole 
custody of Julia at Sandviken District Court. In 
Kay, 1591 she was awarded temporary custody of her 
daughter. In June, 1591 she went to the USA with 
Julia, but returned to Sweden in January, 1992, on 
which occasion she took her daughter with her 
without Mark Larson's consent. When the qualifying 
period for the divorce expired, Sofia Ohlander 
proceeded with her divorce suit- In November, 1992 
verbal proceedings were held in the divorce case, as 
a result of which Sofia Ohlander was awarded 
continued temporary custody of her daughter and Mark 
Larson was granted visiting rights. In May, 1993 
Kark Larson paid a short visit to Sweden, The couple 
were divorced the same year. In November, 1993 Mark 
and his new wife visited Sweden, and subsequently 
took Julia to the USA without Sofia Ohlander's 
consent. In January, 1994 Sofia Shlander went to the 
USA. Under an ex parte order she was provisionally 
awarded custody of Julia without the right to leave 
the USA. However, on February 2, 1954 she took Julia 
with her to Sweden, where they have lived ever 
since. On January 27, 1595 22ark Larson filed a 
petition with the Gavieborg County Administrative 
Court for the return of Julia to the USA under the 
Act (1589:14) concerning the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Decisions relating to Custody 
etc. and concerning the Return of Children (the 
Enforcement Act) . 
The provisions of the Enforcement Act concerning the 
return of children are based on the Convention 
adopted by the Hague Conference in 19SO on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague 
Convention). A general objective of the Convention 
is to protect children against the harmful effects 
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of being uprooted from their familiar environment:. 
For thi3 purpose the Convention includes provisions 
making it possible for a child who has been 
unlawfully abducted from one State Party to another 
to be speedily returned to the former 30 as to 
restore the status quo. The Convention has been 
incorporated into Swedish law insofar as provisions 
intended to reproduce the provisions of the 
Convention have been included in the Enforcement 
Act. The section that is roost relevant to the case 
is section 11 of the Enforcement Act, which 
corresponds to Articles 3 and 12, paragraph 1 of the' 
Hague Convention. As will be explained in greater 
detail below, the main issue in this case is whether 
the abduction of Julia on February 2, 1994 from the 
USA to Sweden was unlawful within the meaning of the 
above section. 
Pursuant to section 11. subsection 1 cf the 
Enforcement Act, a chile who has unlawfully been 
brought to this country, or who is unlawfully held 
in custody here, shall upon demand be returned to 
the person from whom the child is bfcing withheld if 
the child resided, in a State Party immediately prior 
to the abduction cr holding in custody. Under 
section 11, subsection 2. an abduction or holding in 
custody is unlawful if it conflicts with the 
guardian's or another person's right to the custody 
of the child in the state where the child resided 
immediately prior to the abduction cr holding in 
custody, provided that this right was exercised at 
the time when the child was abducted or held in 
custody, or would have been exercised if the 
abduction or holding in custody had not taken place. 
Under the Act the question of who was the child's 
guardian at the time of the abduction and the 
question of whether the abduction was unlawful is to 
be decided in accordance with the law in the st.«*t«t 
in which the child resided at the time of the 
abduction (section 11, subsection 2 and the special 
statement of reasons on this section in Gov. Bill 
1933/89:8, p. 40; see also the provisions of 
sections 14 and 23, subsection 1 of the Act}. 
Another consequence of these provisions is tiiat the 
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abduction of a child from another state to Sweden is 
not unlawful within the meaning of the Act if the 
child resided in Sweden immediately prior to the 
abduction. The meaning or the tern residence is thus 
crucial to the application of the provisions of the 
Snforcezaent Act that relate to the return of a 
child. 
A Swedish court deciding on a petition to return a 
child from Sweden to another country must make an 
independent decision on the residence of the child 
at the time to which section 11. subsection 2 of the 
Enforcement Act is applicable. The term residence is 
ncn defined in the Enforcement Act. In the 
legislative history of the Act (Gcv. 3ill 1933/89:8, 
pp. 36 and 40) reference was made to the 
pronouncements on residence made in connection with 
the incorporation in 1973 of this term in chapter 7, 
section 2 of the Act (1904:35 s. 1) on Certain 
Matters of International Law concerning Marriage and 
Guardianship. (The pronouncements are contained in 
Gov. Bill 1973:153. p-p- 73). This definition and the 
pronouncements in the Bill cited above formed the 
basis of the definition of the ter^ i residence 
applied in subsequent Swedish legislation and. in 
case law on international family law and related 
fields (see, for example, Gov. Bills 1932/83:38, pp. 
12 ff. and 1984/35:124, p. 40, and NJA (New 
Juridical Archives) 1377, p. 706, 1983, p. 359 and 
1987, p. 60C). 
Thus, although the legislative history cf the 
Enforcement Act refers to the need, in connection 
with the application of the provisions of the Act 
that relate to the return of a child, to tak* into 
account the definition of the ter^ i residence used in 
other national legislation, it rrost nevertheless be 
borne in mind that the Enforcement Act is arj Act 
governed by the provisions of an international 
convention. In interpreting this concept it is 
therefore appropriate tc take particular notice of 
the terrrJLnology and purpose of the Hague Convention. 
The expression "residence" in the Enforcement Act 
corresponds to the expression "habitual residence" 
or "residence habituelle" in the Hague Convention. 
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This concept has long been well-established within 
the framework on the Kagrue Conference, and it is 
used in several nf the conventions adopted by the 
Conference. These conventions do not contain an 
explicit definition of the concept, but according to 
the references in the relevant literature the tern 
relates primarily to the actual circumstances (seer 
inter alia, Che summary in SOU (Gov. Official 
Reports) 1976:39, pp. 119-122). Basically, an all-
round appraisal must be made cf such verifiable 
circumstances as the length of the stay and social 
attachments and other circumstances of a personal cr 
professional nature that indicate a lasting 
connection with one country or the other. The 
individual's intention whether or not to stay in the 
country of residence can also be taken into account, 
but the current view appears to be that, as a rule, 
no great importance should be attached to subjective 
factors- In the case of a child who is not old 
enough to make it possible to consider his or her 
intentions regarding the future, other circumstances 
- in particular, the residence of the guardian./ and 
the home and social conditions - must obviously b« 
decisive. The question has been formulated in terns 
of where the child's "effective life center" is (cf. 
SCC 1976:39, p. 120 and Gov. Bill 1984/85:24, p. 
42) . A pcint that should always be considered when 
interpreting the term 'habitual residence", as well 
as the Swedish concept or residence, is that the 
purpose of the rules containing the term should be 
taken into account, and that interpretations may 
therefore differ depending on the context. 
A special issue as regards the residence of small 
children is what rules to apply in cases where the 
parents have joint custody of the child and the 
child is moved from one country to another against 
the will of one o£ th^ guardians. It hes been 
asserted on various occasions that such changes of 
residence should not result in the child acquiring a 
new residence (see, for example, the references 
quoted by 3ccdan in Tidskrift for Juridiska 
Fdreningen i Finland 1982, p. 118, note 38, and NJA 
1995, p. 241) . However, the sphere of application of 
this principle is not clear (cf. 3ogdan, ibzd., 
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118-112, Pdlsson, Svensk rlttspraxis i 
international fartilje- och arvsritt, yg>- 104-108 
and NJA 1974, p. 390 and p. 529 I and II) , With 
particular reference to the Enforcement Act and the 
Hague Convention on which it is based, it should be 
taken into account that one general objective, as 
has already been mentioned/ is to protect children 
against the harmful effects of being uprooted from 
their familiar environment, and that one of the 
functions of the term residence for the purposes of 
the Act, like "habitual residence" in the 
Convention, is to specify the kind of connection 
with a country that givss the right to protection 
under the Act and the Convention, respectively. It 
is not consistent with this objective for an 
abduction against the will of one of the child's 
guardians to be instrumental in chancrinqr the child's 
residence- On the ether hand, it does no: seem 
entirely consistent with that objective to regard 
the circumstances cf the abduction as a permanent 
obstacle to the establishment of a new residence. If 
the child has be^n in the new country for such a 
length of time and under such conditions that it has 
acquired a ccrnert.inr. with the country of the kind 
referred to in the provisions, there should be no 
obstacle to considering that it has acquired a new 
residence. Particular note should be taken in this 
connection of the fact that under the previsions of 
section 12 cf the Enforcement Act, as well as 
Article 12 cf the Convention, the return of a child 
that ha3 been unlawfully abducted may be refused 
where, at the time of the submission of an 
application for the child's return, at least one 
year has passed from the time of abduction and the 
child has settled down in its new environment, 
A matter that must be resolved in this case is 
whether the abducticn of Julia from the USA to 
Sweden in February, 1994 was unlawful within the 
meaning of tha Enforcement Act. From the abov* 
remarks it is clear that the abduction cannot be 
regarded as unlawful it Julia's residence at the 
time of the abduction was Sweden* The evidence shews 
that Julia arrived in Sweden together with her 
mother Sofia Qhlancer in January, 1992 and that she 
subsequently lived with her mother in Sandviken up 
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until November, 19S3, when Marx. Larscn took her to 
the USA without her mother's consent. Nor is there 
any doubt thai: Sofia Chlander acquired Swedish 
residence after her arrival in Sweden. The 
circumstances related above and the other 
information that has been supplied about Julia1s 
s^ay with her mother and her adjustment to 
conditions in Sandviken also clearly indicate that 
she had acquired Swedish residence some time prior 
to her abduction to the USA in November, 1993. 
However, in conformity with the abov« reasoning, the 
circumstances in which Julia was taken back to 
Sweden in January, 1992 should also be taken into 
account in an assessment of her residential status. 
The investigation supports Mark Larson's claim thnt 
the abduction took place against his will. However, 
he did not file a petition for the return of the 
child following the abduction. Considering this 
face, the circumstances in connection with the 
abduction in January, 1932 should not. on expiry of 
the tveive-menth period referred to in both the 
Enforcement Act and the Convention, prevent the 
child from acquiring residence in Sweden. In view of 
the above account of Julia's stay in Sweden and her 
adjustment to Swedish conditions, the Supreme 
Administrative Ccurt finds that she muse be 
considered to have acquired Swedish residence some 
time before November, 1993, when she was taker* back 
to the USA by Mark Larson. The subsequent events -
Julia's abduction to the USA and her stay there 
lasting over two montrxs • cannot once again have 
changed her residential status. Consequently, 
pursuant to section 11, subsection 2 of the 
Enforcement Act, she must be deemed still to have 
had Swedish residence at the time of the abduction 
from the USA in February. 1994 that is a~ issue in 
this case. 
The abduction in February, 1594 was therefore not 
unlawful within the meaning of aection 11, 
3uhsection 2 of the Enforcement Act. Consequently, 
the provisions of the enforcement Act offer no 
possibility of returning Julia to the USA. Sofia 
Ohlander's main suit shall therefore be granted. 
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In view of this ruling, no measures arcs necessary 
with regard to Sofia Ohlander'* demand for further 
investigation in respect of Julia, 
The matter of the parties' legal costs remains to be 
settled. Sofia Shlander's suit implicitly include* a 
demand that she be released from the obligation to 
pay Mark Larson's legal costs in the lower courts -
This matter must be decided in accordance with the 
provisions of section 21 of the Enforcement Act and 
chapter 21, section 13, subsection 1 of the Code on 
Parents, Children and Guardians. Cnder those 
provisions the court may, where this is deemed 
reasonable, order a party to pay the other party's 
legal costs. Cn the basis of an overall assessment 
cf the case the Supreme Administrative Court finds 
than there is no reasonable cause for either of the 
parties to be obliged to pay the other party's legal 
costs. This applies to the parties' legal costs both 
in the lower courts and in the Supreme 
Administrative Court. Therefore, Sofia Ohlander's 
suit shall also be granted in this regard. 
©BCISION OF THS SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
The Supreme Administrative Court reverses the 
judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal and 
upholds the judgment of the County Administrative 
Court in the matter of the return cf the child. 
Reversing the judgment of the Administrative Court 
of Appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court releases 
Sofia Ohlander from the obligation to pay Mark 
Larson's legal costs in the lower court3. 
The Supreme Administrative Court rules that 
remuneration shall be paid under the Legal Aid Act 
in the amount of 16 218 kronor tc Anita Wallin 
wiberg, Attorr.ey-at-law, for her work as counsel for 
Sofia Ohlander and in the amount of 12 4C2 kronor to 
Fredric Renstrom, Attcrney-at-law, for his work as 
counsel for Mark Larscn. Neither party shall be 
obliged to pay the other party's legal costs in the 
Supreme Administrative Court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
iC 
/signature/ 
Stig Brink 
/signature/ 
Elisabeth Palm 
/signature/ 
Sigvard Berglof 
/signature/ 
Anders Swartling 
/signature/ 
Arne Baekkevold 
/signature/ 
Anr-a-Karin Horfsfcedt 
Reading Clerk to the Supreir.e 
Administrative Court 
Div. Ill 
Presented on October 31, 1995 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that 
cne original Swedic 
this is a true translation of 
•vA-V 
O'J/U 
/ 
J 
Robert ?. Cro£ts 
January 9. 1295 
Certified Public Translator fresi 
Swedish into English and froci 
English into Swedish accredited 
by the Swedish Board of Trade 
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HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK ANDREW LARSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs-
KARIN SOFIA LARSON, aka J 
KARIN SOFIA OHLANDER, ) 
Defendant. ] 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
• NUNC PRO TUNC 
Civil No. 944402943 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on October 18, 1996, 
Plaintiff being present and represented by his attorney, Brian C. 
Harrison, and the Defendant being represented by her attorney, 
Daniel Bertch, and the parties' minor child being represented by 
the Guardian Ad Litem, Lorie Fowlke. The Court, having considered 
the argument of counsel and having reviewed the file and being 
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fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of 
Fact said Conclusions of Law; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the divorce and custody 
matters and personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby granted a decree of divorce, nunc pro 
tunc, effective October 21, 1993. 
3. In accordance with Article IV of the Constitution of the 
United States of America and U.S.C. 11603(a), this Court affords 
full faith and credit to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order and Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Utah, dated June 12, 1995, in the Hague Convention case filed by 
Sofia. 
4. None of the temporary custody orders obtained by Sofia in 
Sweden have ever been granted legal recognition under the Utah 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l 
through -26 (1992 & Supp. 1994), and they have no legal force or 
validity in the State of Utah. 
2 
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5. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
$. The present distribution of personal property and debts 
is hereby confirmed. 
7. Permanent sole custody of the parties' minor child, Julia 
Sofia Larson, is hereby awarded to Mark. 
8. Sofia is awarded liberal visitation both in Utah and in 
Sweden, subject to appropriate restrictions that will ensure that 
she does not violate Mark's rights of custody. 
9. Both parties are ordered to actively help Julia acquire 
and maintain the ability to communicate fluently in both English 
and Swedish. 
10. Sofia is ordered to immediately return Julia to Utah and 
turn her over to Mark. To assist in making the transition easier 
for Julia, Sofia is granted daily visitation with Julia in Utah 
during an initial 3-week ^break-in" period, which visitation shall 
be arranged and overseen by the Guardian Ad Litem. 
11. If Sofia fails to turn Julia over to Mark within 14 days 
of the entry of this decree, all law enforcement officers or other 
appropriate authorities of the State of Utah, the United States of 
1
 - 3 
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American, the country of Sweden, or any other jurisdiction where 
the child may be located, are ordered to immediately pick up the 
parties' minor child, Julia Larson, and turn her over to her 
father, Mark Larson. 
12. Mark is awarded child support from Sofia in accordance 
with the Utah State child support guidelines. Mark is not and 
shall not be required to pay child support to Sofia for the times 
when she is or has been unlawfully withholding Julia in violation 
of his custody rights. Mark is entitled to claim Julia as a 
dependent for tax purposes, starting on the tax return due April 
15, 1997. 
13. Sofia is in contempt of court for her willful violations 
of this Court's orders dated March 19, 1996, and September 3, 1996. 
14. Sofia is ordered to immediately pay Mark the two $750 
judgments already entered against her, as well as an additional 
$750 as a sanction for her contempt of the temporary custody order 
dated March 19, 1996, and $500 for her willful failure to answer 
Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents as ordered on September 3, 1996, for a total of $2,750. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15. As long as either party remains a resident of the State 
of Utah, this Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to modify, 
negate, or supersede any of the terms of this decree. 
16. This Court respectfully requests the Swedish courts, law 
enforcement officers, and other authorities to recognize, honor and 
enforce this decree. 
DATED this IH- day of M«i , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE ANTHONY W. SC^OFIELD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
I 
5 
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Cite as 114 F.3d 153 
e Uncompahgre Reservation, and the three 
sputed categories of non-trust lands dis-
ssed above.6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the 
fendants' motion to recall our mandate in 
t Indian Tribe III 773 F.2d 1087 (10th 
-.1985) (en banc), cert denied, 479 U.S. 
I, 107 S.Ct. 596, 93 L.Ed.2d 596 (1986). 
ther, we MODIFY our mandate in Ute 
iian Tribe III as set out above and RE-
LND with instruction that the district 
rt consider the Tribe's request for perma-
it injunctive relief in light of this opinion. 
: «Y NUMB«SYSTIM> 
in Sofia OHLANDER, In the Matter of 
ilia Larson, a Minor Child, #Wa Karin 
>fia Larson, Petitioner-Appellant, 
ark Andrew LARSON, Respondent-
Appellee. 
Nos. 95-4114 & 96-4080. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
June 3, 1997. 
Uter father took child from Sweden to 
d States without mother's permission, 
*r, a Swedish citizen, filed Hague Con-
>n petition seeking child's return to 
2n. Mother subsequently took child 
United States to Sweden, in violation of 
order, and was found in contempt Fa-
hen filed Hague Convention petition in 
in for return of child to United States. 
T filed motion to voluntarily dismiss 
listrict court petition. The United 
decline to address whether any portion of 
ion-trust lands opened in 1905 might still 
itute Indian country under section 1151(b) 
"dependent Indian community" because 
v. LARSON 1531 
I (lOthClr. 1997) 
States District Court for the District of Utah, 
Bruce S. Jenkins, J., denied motion, and 
subsequently ordered child's return to Unit-
ed States. Mother appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Brorby, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
district court abused its discretion in denying 
motion to dismiss solely on basis of mother's 
contempt of its order not to remove child, 
and (2) dismissal of mother's petition was 
warranted. 
Reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions. 
Murphy, Circuit Judge, dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Federal Courts <3=>818 
Court of Appeals will review district 
court's decision to deny voluntary dismissal 
after defendant has filed answer for abuse of 
discretion. Fed.Ruies Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 
28 U.S.CA 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <2>170O 
Absent legal prejudice to defendant, dis-
trict court normally should grant voluntary 
dismissal after defendant has filed answer. 
Fed.Ruies Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.OA. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <5=>1700 
In determining whether defendant 
would suffer legal prejudice from voluntary 
dismissal after defendant has filed answer, 
district court should consider, among other 
relevant factors, defendant's effort and ex-
pense in preparing for trial, excessive delay 
and lack of diligence on part of plaintiff, 
insufficient explanation of need for dismissal, 
and present stage of litigation. Fed.Ruies 
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s>1700 
Each factor considered in determining 
whether defendant would suffer legal preju-
dice from voluntary dismissal after defendant 
has filed answer need not be resolved in 
favor of plaintiff for dismissal to be appropri-
ate, nor need each factor be resolved in favor 
that question is not properly before the court. 
The district court may be asked to consider the 
question upon remand. 
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of defendant for denial of motion to be prop-
er. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700 
In determining: whether to grant volun-
tary dismissal after defendant has filed an-
swer, district court should endeavor to insure 
that substantial justice is afforded to both 
parties. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.CA 
6. Federal Civil Procedure <s> 1693, 1700 
In determining whether to grant volun-
tary dismissal after defendant has filed an-
swer, court must consider equities not only 
facing defendant, but also those facing plain-
tiff; court's refusal to do so is denial of full 
and complete exercise of judicial discretion. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.CA 
7. Federal Civil Procedure @=*1700 
When considering motion to voluntarily 
dismiss case after defendant has filed an-
swer, court must remember that the impor-
tant factors in determining legal prejudice 
are those involving parties, not court's time 
or effort spent on case. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
8. Federal Civil Procedure <3=*1700 
Court abuses its discretion when it de-
nies motion to voluntarily dismiss case after 
defendant has filed answer based on its own 
inconvenience. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA 
9. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700 
District court abused its discretion when 
it denied mother's motion to voluntarily dis-
miss Hague Convention petition for return of 
child to Sweden solely on grounds of her 
contempt of its order not to remove child, 
and without considering any additional cir-
cumstances, including merits of motion. In-
ternational Child Abduction Remedies Act, 
§ 4, 42 U.S.CA. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ. 
Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA 
10. Federal Civil Procedure <3=*1693 
Whether motion to voluntarily dismiss 
case after defendant has filed answer may be 
granted is matter initially left to district 
court's discretion, but such discretion does 
not excuse court's failure to exercise any 
discretion, nor does it save unpermitted exer-
cise of discretion from reversal. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
11. Federal Courts &=>$ 12 
Court abuses its discretion when it fails 
to consider applicable legal standard or facts 
upon which exercise of its discretionary judg-
ment is based. 
12. Federal Courts <s>937.1 
Although district court's failure to apply 
correct legal standard when it denied moth-
er's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague 
Convention petition for return of child to 
Sweden could serve as basis for remand, 
Court of Appeals would determine merits of 
mother's motion, as no dispute regarding 
underlying facts existed and record was ade-
quate to address issues of concern. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA 
13. Federal Civil Procedure <£=>1700 
Mother should have been allowed to vol-
untarily dismiss her Hague Convention peti-
tion for return of child to Sweden, after 
mother had taken child to Sweden and father 
had filed his own Hague Convention petition, 
in Sweden, for return of child to United 
States, as father would not suffer legal preju-
dice from dismissal, claims and defenses of 
both mother and father could be more fairly 
adjudicated in Sweden, and failure to grant 
motion to dismiss could create new incentive 
for parents to flee Hague Convention pro-
ceedings in hope of obtaining second, more 
favorable Convention determination in anoth-
er country. International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act, § 4, 42 U.S.CA. § 11603; 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
U.S.CA 
14. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1701.1 , 
For purposes of determining whether 
mother was entitled to voluntarily dismiss 
her Hague Convention petition for return Of 
child to Sweden, there was no improper d£-
lay or lack of diligence on mother's part 
sufficient to legally prejudice father. Inter* ; 
national Child Abduction Remedies Act, ,j( 4/ ; 
42 U.S.CA § 11603; Fed.Rules CivJProfc \ 
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA 
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L,Federal Civil Procedure <s»1700 . .;. 
" For purposes of determining whether 
tother was entitled to voluntarily dismiss 
er Hague Convention petition for return-of 
lild to Sweden, reasons mother gave'for' 
ranting motion to dismiss, including conten-
on that petition was moot because child was; 
) longer in United States, that Hague Con-
mtion allowed for dismissal of proceedings 
ider such circumstances, and that father 
id initiated duplicative action in Sweden, 
ere-not insufficient such that* theypreju^ 
ced father. International Child Abduction-
emedies Act, § 4, 42 U.S.C.A.' § 11603; 
ed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 
S.C.A-
i. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>780 
Hague Convention petition father filed 
Sweden for return of his child to United 
ates would not be construed as counter-
iim to mother's prior Hague Convention 
stition, filed in United States, foj* return of 
ild to Sweden, as father's claims were as-
rted in court of another jurisdiction. In-
rnational Child Abduction Remedies Act, 
4, 42 U.S.OA. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ. 
•oc.Rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700 
In determining whether to grant moth-
's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague 
invention petition for return of child to' 
reden, which motion was based, in part, on 
iier's subsequent Hague Convention peti-
n filed in Sweden, district court should 
ve considered importance of proper, uni-
•m interpretation of Hague Conventipn, 
>ng .with Convention's purpose. Intema-
nal Child Abduction Remedies Act, § 4, 42 
S.C.A. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
[a)(2), 28 U.S.C JL 
Parent and Child <^18 
Treaties «=>13 
Under contemplated procedures of 
>gue Convention, district court, in ruling on 
ther's Hague Convention petition for re-
-n of child to Sweden, should not have 
isidered mother's removal of child from 
ited States to Sweden in violation of court 
ler, as father had not filed cross-petition 
adjudicate propriety of mother's removal 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act,. 
§.4(b, e), 42 U.S.CJL § 11603(b, e). , , 
19. Contempt <s=>70 , ,t . a 
. Court's interest in ensuring party's com-
pliance with its orders is great one, enforce^ 
able by fines or imprisonment • ..».:!.!< i 
20. Contempt <s=>70 •, . >• ,. >'.*.; ! 
When imposing civil contempt sanctions, 
court is obliged to use least possible power, 
adequate to end proposed. .,» i. . .».»,' 
; • . ' t 
21. Parent and Child e=»18 
Treaties <s=» 13 
District court should not have denied 
mothers motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague 
Convention petition for return of child to* 
Sweden, as civil contempt sanction for moth-
er's conduct in taking child back to Sweden 
in violation of court order, as other measures 
were available to compel compliance with 
order, such as personal sanctions against' 
mother, or possibly staying decision pending 
child's return. International Child Abduc-
tion Remedies Act, §§ 4, 5, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 11603,11604. 
Daniel F. Bertch (Billie C. Nielsen, with 
him on the brief), of Bertch & Birch, Salt 
Lake City, UT, for Petitioner-Appellant. 
Gary L. Paxton (Rodney G. Snow with hini 
on the briefs) of Clyde, Snow & SwensQn, 
P.C., Salt Lake City, UT, for Respowtentr-
Appellee. , , ,.,.,>' 
,
 itl . u .1 
Before BRORBY, BARRETT and., . . 
MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 
BRORBY, Circuit Jydge. 
Ms. Ohlander appeals the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah's judg-
ment denying her petition for the return of 
her daughter Julia to Sweden under the 
Hague Convention, ordering Julia's return to 
Utah, denying her two motions to withdraw 
and dismiss her petition, denying her mo-
tions to stay enforcement of the judgment, 
and a subsequent judgment denying her Fed. 
R.CivJ*. 60(b) motion to set aside the judg-
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ment.1 Applying the standards under Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) in the Hague Convention 
context, wp determine the district court 
abused its discretion in denying the motion 
to dismiss. We reverse and remand to the 
district court with instructions to dismiss Ms. 
Ohiander's petition. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Hague Convention on the Civil As-
pects of International Child Abduction (the 
"Convention"), as implemented by both the 
United States Congress through the Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994), and Sweden, 
was adopted by the signatory nations "to 
protect children internationally from the 
harmful effects of their wrongful removal or 
retention and to establish procedures to en-
sure their prompt return to the State of their 
habitual residence." Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Ab-
duction, Dec. 23, 1981, Preamble, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 10494, 10,498 (1986). The Convention is 
meant to provide for a child's prompt return 
once it has been established the child has 
been 'Vrongfully removed" to or retained in 
any affiliated state. Id., art. 1, 51 Fed.Reg. 
at 10498. 
Under the Convention, a removal or reten-
tion is "wrongful" if: 
a. it is in breach of rights of custody 
attributed to a person, an institution or 
any other body, either jointly or alone, 
under the law of the State in which the 
child was habitually resident immediately 
before the removal or retention; and 
b. at the time of removal or retention 
those rights were actually exercised, either 
jointly or alone, or would have been so 
exercised but for removal or retention. 
IdL, art. 3, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10498. Once a 
removal is deemed "wrongful." "the authority 
concerned shall order the return of the 
child." Id., art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499. 
However, the Convention provides for sever-
al exceptions to return if the person opposing 
return can show any of the following: 1) the 
1. Ms. Ohiander's appeal of the district court's 
denial of her motion to set aside the judgment 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) was consolidated with 
the direct appeal. 
person requesting return was not, at the time 
of the retention or removal, actually exercis-
ing custody rights or had consented to or 
subsequently acquiesced in the removal or 
retention, ?rf„. art. 13a. 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499, 
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); 2) the return of 
the child would result in grave risk of physi-
cal or psychological harm to the child, id-
art. 13b, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); 3) the 
return of the child ,lwould not be permitted-
by the fundamental principles of the request-
ed State relating to the protection of human, 
rights and fundamental freedoms," id., art, 
20, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10500, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(e)(2)(A); or 4) the proceeding was1 
commenced more than one year after the' 
abduction and the child has become settled in 
the new environment, id., art. 12, 51 Fed.' 
Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). 
II. FACTS 
Ms. Ohlander, a Swedish citizen, and Mr. 
Larson, a United States citizen, were mar-
ried in Utah in 1989. In August 1990. their 
daughter Julia was born in Provo, Utah. 
During the Christmas holiday season of 
1990-91, when Julia was five months old, the 
entire family traveled to Sweden to visit Ms. 
Ohiander's family with the intent to return to> 
their Utah home in January 1991. After 
arriving in Sweden. Ms. Ohlander decided to 
remain in Sweden with Julia; Ms. Ohlander 
went into hiding with her daughter and sev-. 
ered contact with her husband. Mr. Larson, 
returned to Utah alone in mid-January 1991. 
By April 1991, Mr. Larson had reestab-
lished contact with Ms. Ohlander. In June 
1991. with Julia now almost a year old, Ms. 
Ohlander returned to Utah to be with Mr.! 
Larson. Ms. Ohlander and Julia remained' 
with Mr. Larson for seven months. On Jan*-' 
uary 13, 1992, Ms. Ohlander returned with. 
Julia to Sweden without Mr. Larson's con-
sent. 
By November 1993,2 Julia had resided conf | 
tinuously in Sweden for almost two years, i 
and was a little over three years old. Mr.} 
2. Between Januarv 1992 and November 1993)° 
Ms. Ohlander and Mr. Larson were participating' 
in divorce and custody proceedings taking placto 
in Sweden. 
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arson returned to Sweden with his new wife 
) see Julia, and during one visitation, ap-
iied the law of "grab and run" taking Julia 
ack to Utah without Ms. Ohlander's con-
»nt. In January 1994, Ms. Ohiander filed a 
2tition seeking her daughter's return pursu-
it to the Hague Convention in the United 
tates District Court for the District of Utah. 
is. Ohiander also secured an ex parte Order 
•r Issuance of Warrant in Lieu of Writ of 
abeas Corpus from the district court, di-
eting peace officers to take Julia into pro-
active custody and to release her to Ms. 
hlander, but prohibiting Ms. Ohiander from 
imoving Julia from Utah pending further 
1er. Mr. Larson delivered Julia to Ms. 
lander on January 30, 1994, and on Febru-
-y 1, 1994, Ms. Ohiander disobeyed the 
)urt's order and applied her own version of 
ie law of "grab and run" by returning to 
kveden with Julia. 
In August 1994, shortly after Julia's fourth 
rthday, the district court entered an order 
riding Ms. Ohiander in contempt and direct-
g her to return Julia to the United States 
ithin thirty days. Ms. Ohiander failed to 
imply. Two months later, in October 1994, 
Uowing Ms. Ohlander's and Julia's return 
Sweden, Mr. Larson filed a Convention 
)plication for Julia's return with the United 
;ates Central Authority, which was forward-
1 to Sweden's Central Authority.3 Ms. Ohl-
lder then filed a motion, pursuant to Fed. 
.Civ.P. 41(a)(2), to dismiss her district court 
itition, based, in part, on the Convention's 
t. 12, which authorizes a judicial authority 
stay or dismiss the application or judicial 
•oceedings seeking a child's return.4 
ague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 
1499. In January 1995, prior to the hearing 
l Ms. Ohlander's motion, Mr. Larson peti-
>ned the Sweden court pursuant to the 
anvention for Julia's return on the ground 
42 U.S.C. § 11602 distinguishes between appli-
cations and petitions filed under the Convention. 
A petition exists upon a person filing for relief in 
court, while an application exists upon a person 
filing with the United States' or any other coun-
try's Central Authority for a child's return. 42 
U.S.C. § 1 ic02(l). (4)' 
Specifically, the Convention's an. 12 slates: 
Where the judicial or administrative authority 
in the requested State has reason to believe 
Ms. Ohiander had 'Vrongfully removed" her 
from Utah.5 
The United States district court conducted 
a hearing on Ms. Ohlander's motion to dis-
miss. During that hearing, the United 
States district court was informed of Mr. 
Larson's Hague Convention proceeding in 
Sweden. The district court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss solely on the basis of Ms. 
Ohlander's contempt of its order not to re-
move Julia from Utah. Ms. Ohiander later 
orally renewed her motion to dismiss, which 
the district court denied on the same 
grounds. 
The district court conducted a bench trial 
on Ms. Ohlander's Hague Convention petition 
to determine the issues of habitual residence 
and wrongful removal pursuant to the Con-
vention. However, neither Ms. Ohiander nor 
Julia was present for the hearing, nor did 
they testify by other means. Ms. Ohiander 
presented no live witnesses and relied only 
on the stipulated facts set out in the Pretrial 
Order. Ultimately, the district court found 
Julia was at all times a "habitual resident" of 
Utah, and as such, Ms. Ohlander's retention 
of Julia in Sweden in 1991, and her removals 
of Julia from Utah in 1992 and 1994 were all 
'"wrongful" under the Convention. Accord-
ingly, the district court ordered Julia's imme-
diate return to Utah and requested the aid of 
the Contracting States in achieving that goal. 
Following the United States district court's 
decision, the Sweden courts held hearings to 
determine the merits of Mr. Larson's peti-
tion. Both Mr. Larson and Ms. Ohiander 
were present during the Sweden court pro-
ceeding. The Sweden Supreme Administra-
tive Court held Julia's habitual residence 
changed from Utah to Sweden after she had 
lived in Sweden for twelve months following 
the January 1992 abduction—a decision di-
that the child has been taken to another state, 
it may stay the proceedings, or dismiss the 
application for the return of the child. 
Hague Convention, art. 12. 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499. 
5. Presumably. Mr. Larson filed the petition in 
addition lo the application to prevent Ms. Ohian-
der from asserting the **:>cltled environment" de-
fense as it pertained to Ms. Ohlander's 1994 
removal. This defense is discussed infra at p. 
1540. 
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rectly in conflict with the United States dis-
trict court's holding. 
Once the Sweden court had made its rul-
ing, Ms. Ohlander filed a motion to stay 
enforcement of the United States district 
court's order, and a motion to set aside the 
United States' judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
60(b). The United States district court de-
nied the motions, again solely on the basis of 
Ms. Ohlander's contempt. We are present-
ed, therefore, with two international deci-
sions standing in direct conflict, and it is this 
contradiction we attempt to resolve for both 
the present case and for future cases. 
III. DISCUSSION 
This case presents issues novel to this 
court, and according to our research, novel to 
this country. Our aim is to provide courts 
with guidance in future similar cases, namely, 
where two civil actions under the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abductions are filed in disparate 
courts due to a child's removal from the court 
of first jurisdiction. Also, our aim is to give 
meaning to the Convention's intended pur-
pose of discouraging parents from fleeing 
with their children in search of a favorable 
decision. Notably, we are faced not only 
with issues of the proper interpretation of 
bare text in the form of the Hague Conven-
tion treaty, but also with the plight of a now 
six-year-old girl to whom the law of "grab 
and run" repeatedly has been applied. 
We therefore must examine the following 
competing interests of: the district court en-
suring compliance with its orders; the proce-
dural conduct of the parties; and most im-
portant, the Convention's intent and our duty 
to see that intent justly carried out. Against 
this backdrop, we attempt to untangle the 
Gordian knot the parents, together, have 
seen fit to tie. 
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS 
Even though Ms. Ohlander appeals several 
of the district court's rulings, our decision on 
the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) is dispositive. Thus, we 
need not address the remaining issues. We 
therefore turn our focus to whether the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in denying 
Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). 
A. Relevant Facts 
Ms. Ohlander's first motion to dismiss was 
filed shortly after Mr. Larson filed his Ha?ue 
application for Julia's return to Utah with the 
United States Central Authority. Ms. Ohl-
ander's counsel raised her second motion to 
dismiss orally during the bench trial. Rely-
ing on the Convention's art. 12, Ms. Ohlander 
argued in her first motion to dismiss that 
because Julia was no longer in the United 
States and because Mr. Larson had initiated 
his own Hague Convention application, the 
United States district court should dismiss 
the petition for Julia's return to Sweden. By 
the time the United States district court 
heard arguments regarding the first motion 
to dismiss, Mr. Larson had initiated his own 
petition in the Sweden courts regarding the 
wrongfulness of Julia's removal from the 
United States. The district court was aware 
of the duplicative judicial action in Sweden. 
Notwithstanding its knowledge of Mr. Lar-
son's Hague Convention proceedings in Swe-
den, the district court summarily denied Ms. 
Ohlander's motion solely on the basis of Ms. 
Ohlander's contempt stating: 
I'm not going to grant the Motion to 
Dismiss and I'm not going to grant it 
simply because this woman, the petitioner, 
in my opinion, isn't in a position to ask me 
to do that, because she's in violation of the 
orders of this Court. She is simply in 
violation. She invoked the jurisdiction. 
She asked for our help, and then she, 
contrary to the order of the Court, ran. 
In her second motion to dismiss, Ms. Ohlan-
der relied again on the Convention's art. 12, 
the fact that Julia was no longer in the 
United States, and the fact that Mr. Larson 
had initiated judicial proceedings in Sweden. 
The district court again denied Ms. Ohlan-
der's second motion to dismiss due to her 
contumacious conduct. 
B. Relevant Factors Considered Under 
41(a)(2)IStandard of Review 
[1-4] Once a defendant files an answer,, 
as was the case here, a plaintiff may volun-
tarily dismiss an action only upon order of 
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district court's decision to deny a volun-
r
 dismissal under such conditions for 
se of discretion. American Nat'l Bank & 
st Co. v. Bic Corp., 931 F.2d 1411, 1412 
h Cir.1991). Absent "legal prejudice" to 
defendant, the district court normally 
dd grant such a dismissal. See Andes v. 
unt Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 (4th Cir. 
i) (voluntary dismissal "should not be de-
absent substantial prejudice to the de-
ant"); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 
855, 856-57 (11th Cir.1986) ("in most 
3 a dismissal shouid be granted unless 
defendant will suffer clear legal preju-
'\ The parameters of what constitutes 
prejudice" are not entirely clear, but 
ant factors the district court should con-
include: the opposing party's effort and 
ise in preparing for trial; excessive de-
nd lack of diligence on the part of the 
nt; insufficient explanation of the need 
, dismissal; and the present stage of 
tion. Phillips U.S.A, Inc. v. Allflez 
L, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir.1996). 
factor need not be resolved in favor of 
loving party for dismissal to be appro-
s, nor need each factor be resolved in 
of the opposing party for denial of the 
n to be proper. Id. at 358. 
\ above list of factors is by no means 
iive. Id. at 358. Any other relevant 
s should come into the district court's 
on. In fact, in the context of this 
j Convention proceeding, the district 
was impressed with a duty to exercise 
cretion by carefully appraising any ad-
d factors unique u> the context of this 
ncluding the interests in comity, uni-
interpretation of the Convention and 
portance of giving import to the Hague 
ition's intended purpose as relevant to 
tion to dismiss. 
] The district court should endeavor 
ire substantial justice is accorded to 
arties. 9 Charles Alan Wright and 
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
§ 2364 at 278 (2d ed. 1994). A court, 
re, must consider the equities not only 
the defendant, but also those facing 
intiff; a court's refusal to do so is a 
of a full and complete exercise of 
OHLANDER v. LARSON 
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41(a)(2). We review judicial discretion. 
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Id. at 297. In a complex, 
emotional case such as this, it is critically 
important when considering a motion to dis-
miss, the court give the equities of the plain-
tiff the attention deserved. 
[7, 8] Finally, when considering a motion 
to dismiss, a court must remember the im-
portant factors in determining legal prejudice 
are those involving the parties, not the 
court's time or effort spent on the case. 
Clark v. Tansy, 13 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th 
Cir. 1993). A court abuses its discretion 
when denying a motion to dismiss under 
Ruie 41(a)(2) based on its inconvenience. Id. 
at 1411. 
[9-11] In sum, the district court was obli-
gated to consider the novelty of the circum-
stances surrounding this case. Instead, the 
court did not consider the merits of Ms. 
Ohlander's motion due exclusively to her con-
tumacious conduct. It is true Ms. Ohlander 
blatantly violated the court's orders and ab-
sconded to Sweden with Julia in tow. We 
refuse to condone such conduct. However, 
neither can we condone a court ignoring its 
duty to consider the merits of a motion to 
dismiss simply because a party has violated 
its orders. Whether a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 41(a)(2) may be granted is a 
matter initially left to the district court's 
discretion, but such discretion does not ex-
cuse a court's failure to exercise any discre-
tion, nor does it save an unpermitted exercise 
of discretion from reversal. Alamance In-
dus., Inc. v. Fihme\ 291 F.2d 142, 146-17 
(1st Cir.), cert denied, 368 U.S. 831, 82 S.Ct. 
53, 7 L.Ed.2d 33 (1961). A clear example of 
an abuse of discretion exists where the trial 
court fails to consider the applicable legal 
standard or the facts upon which the exercise 
of its discretionary judgment is based. See 
McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cos. Co., 888 
F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (reviewing a 
district court's 60(a) motion under an abuse 
of discretion standard). We believe the dis-
trict court's decision to deny Ms. Ohlander's 
motion solely on the grounds of her contempt 
and without considering any additional cir-
cumstances, amounts to a failure to exercise 
discretion, and is, consequently, an abuse of 
that discretion. 
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C. Merits of Ms. Ohlander's 41(a)(2) 
Motion 
1. Traditional Factors 
[121 Although the district court's failure 
to apply the correct legal standard could 
serve as a basis for remand, in the interest of 
efficiency and judicial economy, and in the 
interest of providing immediate guidance as 
to the most appropriate direction of this case 
in light of the Convention's purpose, we turn 
to the merits of Ms. Ohlanders motion to 
dismiss. Clark 13 F.3d at 1411-13 (consid-
ering on appeal the merits of motion to dis-
miss after district court abused its discre-
tion); Park County Resource Council v. 
United States Dept of Agrii, 817 F.2d 609, 
617-18 (10th Cir.1987) ("Although failure to 
apply correct legal standard could be basis 
for remand to the district court, we have 
found that remand is not necessary where 
there is no dispute regarding the underlying 
facts and where it is in the interest of judicial 
economy and efficiency to decide the mat-
ter."); see also McCord v. Bailey, 636 F2d 
606, 613 (D.C.Cir.1980) (although inadequate 
findings and conclusions may be remanded to 
the district court for supplementation, appel-
late court will not remand for more specific 
findings if doing so will consume judicial 
resources without serving any purpose). We 
believe, as is obvious from our remaining 
analysis, no dispute regarding the underlying 
facts exists and the existing record is ade-
quate to address the issues of concern. 
[13,14] Mr. Larson argues that to grant 
Ms. Ohlander's motion would subject him to 
legal prejudice. More specifically, Mr. Lar-
6. The dissent opines our statement here "is a 
conclusory statement lacking support in the rec-
ord" because between the time Ms. Ohlander 
initiated the Convention proceeding and filed her 
motion to dismiss. Ms. Ohlander "did virtually 
nothing to affirmatively move her case along." 
Unfortunately, this court has yet to explicitly 
define "diligence" in the context of a Rule 
41(a)(2) motion to dismiss. While the dissent 
purports an "affirmative act" requirement, the 
cases from this circuit touching on the issue 
characterize diligence quite differently. Allflex, 
77 F.3d at 358 (movants request for additional 
time to respond to proffered facts and to conduct 
further discovery constituted lack of diligence); 
Clark. 13 F.3d at 1412 (movant's failure to ex-
haust state claims for purposes of habeas review 
"cannot be construed as lack of diligence"); see 
son argues he would be unfairly prejudiced 
by Ms. Ohlander's excessive delay and lack of 
diligence, and by the lack of a sufficient 
explanation in favor of dismissal. See All-
flex, 77 F.3d at 358. Mr. Larson argues Ms. 
Ohlander's fiiing of her motion to dismiss 
eleven months after the initiation of the pro-
ceedings and after Mr. Larson had requested 
a final pretrial hearing constitutes delay and 
lack of diligence. However, while Ms. Ohlan-
der moved to dismiss her petition eleven 
months after she initiated the proceeding, 
our examination of the record illustrates Ms. 
Ohlander filed her motion to dismiss only 
after Mr. Larson had filed his application for 
Julia's return with the United States Central 
Authority. Therefore, the most persuasive 
reason to file a motion to dismiss did not 
arise until eleven months following the initial 
proceeding's initiation. As a result, the tim-
ing of Ms. Ohlanders motion could not con-
stitute excessive delay sufficient to legally 
prejudice Mr. Larson. Moreover, the record 
shows Ms. Ohlander's counsel was actively 
and diligently moving forward with the case 
regardless of Ms. Ohlander's absence. 
Counsel was present at and participated in 
every hearing.6 Therefore, we conclude 
there was no improper delay or lack of dili-
gence on Ms. Ohlander's part sufficient to 
legally prejudice Mr. Larson. 
[15] Further, we believe the reasons Ms. 
Ohlander has given for granting the motion 
to dismiss are not insufficient such that they 
prejudice Mr. Larson. In her motions to 
dismiss, Ms. Ohlander argued her petition 
was moot and because Julia was no longer in 
also. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp, 789 
F.2d 497. 504 (7th Cir.1986) (lack of diligence, 
may be shown by evidence of bad faith or unwar-
ranted delay). We are not certain what "affirma-
tive acts" the dissent would require, and to the 
extent it would require a movant to file addition-
al motions prior to a motion to dismiss, ail in the 
name of "affirmative acts." we disagree. In fact, 
affirmative acts to prolong litigation more typi-: 
cally provide a basis for finding excessive delay; 
and lack of diligence. See, e.g., Allflex. 77 F.3d at 
358. The record before us shows counsel was 
present at and fully participated in all hearings 
and. outside the motions to dismiss, which were' 
timely filed, did not cause undue delay. Conse-
quently, there is adequate support in the record, 
to reach our conclusion. 
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ah, the Convention's art. 12 allowed for a 
y or dismissal of the proceedings. Ms. 
lander also relied on the fact Mr. Larson 
iself initiated a duplicative action in Swe-
i as further support for the imposition of 
Convention's art. 12 dismissal provision, 
-tainly, the first two reasons alone are 
ifficient to support a motion to dismiss 
I could give parents an undue incentive to 
i from Hague Convention proceedings, 
vever, as discussed at length below, we 
:e greater weight on Ms. Ohlander's prof-
id reasons that Mr. Larson initiated a 
>nd action in Sweden and that the Con-
Lion's art. 12 lends support for dismissing 
United States proceeding. Ms. Ohlan-
reasons for requesting the motion to 
liss are not insufficient such that they 
lly prejudice Mr. Larson. Rather, as 
Ohlander emphasizes, by initiating a ju-
J proceeding in Sweden Mr. Larson him-
along with the Convention's terms, pro-
i the most persuasive reason to dismiss 
United States district court proceeding. 
Larson is hard pressed to argue he is 
idiced by his own actions. 
I] Mr. Larson also argues the motion 
smiss should not be granted because his 
>nse to Ms. Ohlander's Hague Conven-
petition should be construed as a coun-
um. It is true a court may construe a 
ing mistakenly designated as a defense 
counterclaim when justice requires. 
l.Civ.P. 8(c). However, because Mr. 
•n filed his own Hague Convention peti-
n Sweden, we remain unconvinced jus-
e dissent claims that by relying on the fact 
Larson initialed the second proceeding in 
den we are somehow "punishing" Mr. Lar-
for enlisting the aid of the Sweden courts. 
be contrary, we are only holding Mr. Larson 
untable for his actions. Even though Julia 
no longer within the United States when Mr. 
an filed the petition in Sweden, the United 
s court retained jurisdiction to determine 
s state of habitual residence. See 42 U.S.C. 
)03(b). The United States district court had 
licuon over the original petition as the court 
he place where the child is located at the 
the petition is filed." Therefore, even 
;h Julia was removed, the United States 
retained jurisdiction to determine the 
s place of habitual residence. Additionally, 
srniissive language of the Convention's art. 
smissal provision, which allows a court to 
Dr dismiss an action versus mandating a 
OHLANDER v. LARSON 1539 
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tice requires us Co construe Mr. Larson's 
response to Ms. Ohlanders petition as a 
counterclaim in this case. Mr. Larson chose 
to assert his claims in a court of another 
jurisdiction. Justice does not require us to 
tortuously construe his response to Ms. Ohl-
ander's petition simply to retain jurisdiction 
over this matter. Had Mr. Larson wanted 
the United States courts to adjudicate his 
claim Ms. Ohlander wrongfully removed Julia 
from Utah, he would have been far better 
served by filing a cross-petition with the 
district court rather than initiating an entire-
ly new proceeding in Sweden. Consequently, 
we refuse to construe Mr. Larson's response 
as a counterclaim.7 
2. Additional Relevant Factors 
[17] As already noted, given the unique 
circumstances of this case, the district court 
should have considered the importance of a 
proper, uniform interpretation of the Con-
vention, along with a consideration of the 
Convention's purpose, when evaluating the 
merits of Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss. 
We now consider those factors. 
a. Proper Interpretation of the Hague 
Convention's Procedures 
When the district court considered wheth-
er Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia from 
Utah was wrongful, it misconstrued the Con-
vention's contemplated procedures. Accord-
ing to the Convention, once a petition is filed, 
a court should consider only whether a re-
dismissal once a child is removed, suggests the 
United States court retained jurisdiction even 
after Julia was removed from Utah. 
Rather than relying on the original action, Mr. 
Larson initiated a second proceeding, which has 
resulted in a ruling contrary to his interests and 
which has resulted in two conflicting internation-
al decisions, a problem we must somehow ad-
dress. Certainly, we are not punishing him by 
subjecting him to the results of the proceeding 
he, in fact, initiated. Further, the fact Mr. Lar-
son attempted to limit the Sweden court's juris-
diction is of no moment. Once Mr. Larson filed 
the petition in the Sweden court, that court had 
proper jurisdiction to determine Julia's place of 
habitual residence regardless of the fact Mr. Lar-
son attempted to limit the Sweden court's review 
to the 1994 removal. Hague Convention, art. 3, 
51 Fed.Reg. at 10498. 
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spondevt's removals of a child are wrongful. 
Sec Hague Convention, arts. 3, 12, 51 Fed. 
Reg. at KM98. 10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b). 
(eh Here, antithetic to the Convention's in-
tent as a whole, the court considered whether 
the petitwnrr's removals of the child were 
wrongful. 
[18] When Ms. Ohlander petitioned the 
United States district court for Julia's return 
to Sweden, the issue before the court was 
whether Mr. Larson's removal of Julia from 
Sweden was wrongful pursuant to the Con-
vention. Hague Convention, art. 3, 51 Fed. 
Reg. at 10498. Once Ms. Ohlander removed 
Julia from Utah, the issue became whether 
Ms. Ohlander's removals were wrongful. Id. 
By filing his own petition in the Sweden 
courts, Mr. Larson chose to adjudicate Ms. 
Ohlander's removals of Julia in the foreign 
court rather than in the United States dis-
trict court. The district court's consideration 
of Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia without 
Mr. Larson having filed a cross-petition in 
that court was contrary to the Convention's 
intended procedures. 
Additionally, denial of Ms. Ohlander's mo-
tion to dismiss renders Ms. Ohlander's most 
relevant defense to Julia's return to Utah 
unavailable, namely, the "settled environ-
ment" defense. Hague Convention, art. 12, 
51 Fed.Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). Under the Convention's 
plain terms, one defense to a child's return is 
showing the petition was filed a year after 
the child's removal or retention and that the 
child has become settled in his or her new 
environment Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 
Fed.Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). When Ms. Ohlander filed 
her petition, she was asking for Julia's return 
to Sweden; any defenses to Julia's return, 
under Article 12 or otherwise, were available 
only to the respondent, Mr. Larson. See 
Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 
8. The dissent takes issue with our interpretation 
of the availability of this defense to Ms. Ohlan-
der. Apparently, the dissent interprets the Con-
vention as restricting the Sweden courts review 
to Ms. Ohlanders 1994 removal of Julia and not 
to allow review of Ms. Ohlander's additional 
retentions and removals of Julia, particularly Ms. 
Ohlanders 1992 removal of Julia from Utah. We 
disagree with this interpretation. The Conven-
10499, 42 U.S.C. * 11603(e)(2)(B). Conse-
quently, Ms. Ohlander could not, under the 
Convention's contemplated procedures, prop-
erly assert the "settled environment" de-
fense. However, once Mr. Larson filed his 
own petition in Sweden seeking to adjudicate 
Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia from Utah. 
Ms. Ohlander rightfully could assert the "sec-
tied environment" defense. Hague Conven-
tion, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). Conversely, had Mr. Lar-
son filed a cross-petition in the United States 
district court for Julia's return to Utah, rath-
er than instigating an entirely new action in 
Sweden, Ms. Ohlander properly could have 
asserted her defenses in the United States 
district court. Since Mr. Larson chose to 
initiate a second Convention proceeding in 
Sweden, Sweden was the jurisdiction where 
the claims and defenses of both Ms. Ohlander 
and Mr. Larson could be more fairly adjudi-
cated. Therefore, the proper interpretation 
of the Convention weighs in favor of dismiss-
ing the United States action and allowing the 
issues to be decided in Sweden.8 
This result is further supported by the 
plain language of the Convention's art. 12, 
which states "where the judicial or adminis-
trative authority in the requested State has 
reason to believe the child has been taken to 
another State, it may stay the proceedings or 
dismiss the application for the return of the 
child/' Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed. 
Reg. at 10499. While this language is per-
missive rather than mandatory, its words 
merit a court's consideration when denying a 
motion to dismiss. Congress has declared 
the importance of "the need for uniform in-
ternational interpretation of the Convention." 
42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B). Article 12 helps 
to ensure two disparate courts will not reach 
conflicting decisions by encouraging courts to 
dismiss or stay their actions where appropri-
ate. This case poses a perfect example of 
the need for Article 12's dismissal provision: 
tion ts intended to provide finality to the parties, 
and it is our duty to see this intent carried out 
We note this is an extremely difficult case, deal-
ing with the Convention's interpretation, an area 
singularly lacking in helpful precedent or con-
gressional guidance. It is merely our duty to 
resolve this case as best we can in accordance 
with our interpretation of the Convention and to 
give import to the intentions of that Convention. 
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United States district court had knowl-
;e that Julia had been taken to Sweden, 
I that a second action initiated by Mr. 
•son was pending in Sweden, where all the 
ties, including the child, were present, 
irefore, we conclude the adherence to in-
ied Hague Convention procedures sup-
t Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss. 
b. Intent of the Hague Convention 
ailing to grant the motion to dismiss 
re a second duplicative action has been 
I in a different country would potentially 
ier the Hague Convention meaningless. 
I of the Convention's intent is "to ensure 
rights of custody and of access under 
aw of one Contracting State are effec-
y respected in other Contracting States." 
ue Convention, art. 1(b), 51 Fed.Reg. at 
>8. Prior to the Convention, when faced 
an unfavorable custody decision, a par-
vould flee to another country in search of 
stody decision in his or her favor. This 
d often result in rwo conflicting custody 
>ions without guidance as to which coun-
custody decision had preference. The 
je Convention was drafted with the in-
to remove forever the incentive for a 
nt to flee across borders to obtain a 
able ruling. Letter of Transmittal from 
dent Ronald Reagan (Oct. 30, 1985), 
nted in 51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10,495 
I); Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 
> (1986). Under the Convention, a child 
be expediently returned to his or her 
of habitual residence "so that a court 
can examine the merits of the custody 
te and award custody in the child's best 
ists" Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. at 
i. As a result, the Convention was 
t, in part, to lend priority to the custody 
mination hailing from the child's state 
)itual residence. 
He the Convention proceedings in this 
certainly have not achieved this intend-
jult, a refusal to dismiss this action only 
rbates the problem. By failing to dis-
he United States action we would allow 
nd two conflicting decisions regarding 
* dissent opines our reliance on this factor is 
c because the conflict between the two deci-
was merely "potential" at the time Mr. 
3n Bled the duplicative action in Sweden. It 
Julia's state of habitual residence, which 
could very well require a Hague Convention 
to determine which Hague Convention deter-
mination is valid. This, of course, is absurd. 
By dismissing this action, we instead require 
these and future litigants to choose which 
jurisdiction will determine a child's state of 
habitual residence, thereby salvaging what 
we can of the Convention's intended pur-
pose.9 • ' 
Failing to grant the motion to dismiss also 
could create a new incentive for parents to 
flee Hague Convention proceedings in the 
hope of obtaining a second, more favorable 
Convention determination in another coun-
try. We then would be left to solve the 
riddle of which competing ruling in each case 
is valid. This is a task we refuse to acquire. 
Rather, we believe the parties' interests 
would be best represented and judicial re-
sources best spent if parents engaged in this 
type international custody battle are re-
quired to resolve their dispute in one juris-
diction or the other. Holding Mr. Larson 
and future litigants to one jurisdiction gives 
import to the Convention's intended mean-
ing. 
c Ms. Ohlander's Contempt 
[19-211 Certainly, the court's interest in 
ensuring a party's compliance with its orders 
is a great one, enforceable by fines or impris-
onment. Spallone v. United States, 493 US. 
265, 276, 110 S.Ct. 625, 632-33, 107 L.Ed^d 
644 (1990). However, a court is obliged to 
use the "'least possible power adequate to 
the end proposed.1" Id at 276, 110 S.Ct at 
632 (quoting United States v. Yankers, 856 
F.2d 444, 454 (2d Cir.1988), and Anderson v. 
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)). 
Here, certainly other measures were avail-
able to compel compliance, such as personal 
sanctions against the mother, or possibly 
staying a decision pending the child's return. 
Under the provisions of the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act, the district 
court has the authority to implement mea-
ts precisely the "potentiai" conflict between dif-
ferent countries' custody decisions that made the 
Convenuon necessary. 
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sures to "prevent the child's further removal 
or concealment before the final disposition of 
the petition." 42 U.S.C. § 11604. Given Ms. 
Ohlander's history of removing Julia from 
the United States, to prevent Ms. Ohlander 
from repeating this behavior, perhaps the 
district court should have imposed more rigid 
measures, such as requiring Ms. Ohlander to 
surrender both her and Julia's passports to 
the clerk of court prior to receiving physical 
custody of Julia, or leaving custody with Mr. 
Larson pending the petition's outcome. See 
Currier v. Currier, 845 F.Supp. 916, 923 
(D.N.H.1994) (district court requiring peti-
tioner surrender her and her children's pass-
port to the court's clerk pending appeal). 
However, if such measures are not imposed, 
or if they fail, the court is not thereby re-
leased of its duty to consider the merits of 
the parties' cases when considering how best 
to enforce compliance. In sum, there is no 
doubt Ms. Ohlander's actions were contempt-
ible, for she brazenly thumbed her nose at 
the United States district court's order not to 
remove Julia from Utah; nevertheless, such 
conduct does not warrant a court denying a 
motion to dismiss solely on that ground. 
In sum, we hold it necessary to dismiss 
this action. Mr. Larson does not suffer legal 
prejudice from such a dismissal, and the 
balance of relevant factors, along with the 
intent of the Convention, weigh in favor of 
dismissal. 
, We REVERSE the district court and RE-
MAND with instructions to dismiss the peti-
tion without prejudice. 
MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I concur in the majority's conclusion that 
the district court erred in failing to consider 
the governing legal standards and relevant 
facts relating to Ms. Ohlander's Fed.R.Civ.P. 
41 motion to dismiss. Rather than resolve 
the Rule 41 issue ourselves, however, we 
should remand this case to the district court 
for an appropriate Rule 41 evaluation and an 
accompanying adequate development of the 
1. As discussed on pages 1534-35. the only other 
factor the majority articulates in favor of Ms. 
Ohlander's motion is its conclusory statement, 
lacking support in the record, that there was no 
excessive delay and lack of diligence on Ms. 
record in light of the new law established bj] '< 
this court's opinion. Therefore, I dissenfc 1 
from the majority's resolution of the motiotf'" 
to dismiss on the merits and its failure'tof-
remand. "^nt\~ 
A Rule U(a)(2) Factors • ^ ; 
The trial court denied Ms. Ohlander's Fed. *~ 
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss for the ) 
sole reason that Ms. Ohlander was in cotK^ 
tempt of court. In doing so, the court fe2ai^ 
to consider the appropriate legal standarajj 
under Rule 41(a)(2). Although the trial cour^  
could properly consider Ms. Ohlander's coijg' 
temptuous conduct, it was also required tjrj 
evaluate other governing legal criteria 
McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cos. Co.,-. 889 
F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (noting trig, 
court errs when it fails to consider applicable 
legal standard or facts on which exercise tJftj 
discretionary judgment is based). Its faihwj 
to do so requires reversal. t^taf^  
Ironically, the majority has reversed .thtfj 
district court for refusing to grant Ms. QptfM 
ander's motion for the sole reason that %^J 
was in contempt of court, yet ruled de 
that Ms. Ohlander's motion should be
 w 
ed for the sole reason that Mr. Larson 
ated his own Hague Convention proce&fJS 
ings.1 The district court was required 
evaluate fairly all Rule 41 factors; we shi 
similarly be bound. An adequate recorcf\ 
remand, however, would be necessary. 
In evaluating a Rule 41(a)(2) motion jt9 
dismiss, a court must consider the preju 
to the non-moving party. Clark v. Tansffl. 
F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir.1993). In m ' 
we adopted the following factors to' 
"legal prejudice" to the opposing partyi^l 
the non-moving party's effort and expen 
preparation for trial; (2) the moving pa 
delay and lack of diligence in prosecuting I 
action; and (3) insufficient explanation1^ 
the need to allow a dismissal. Clark, 131 
t d 
Ohlander's part in bringing her moi 
Stripped of this unsupported assertion, it iCci 
dent that the majority's outcome rests on 
the desire to avoid a potentially conflicting'* 
sion from another sovereign state. 
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t 1411. This list is not exhaustive; a court 
lay also consider other relevant factors in 
* Rule 41(a)(2) analysis. Phillips USA 
nc. v. All/lex USA Inc., 77 F 3d 354, 358 
LOth Cir.1996) (noting above factors are not 
xclusive, but instead are guides for district 
Durt). 
The record does not address Mr. Larson's 
ffort and expense of preparation for trial. 
Is. Ohlander did not file her motion to dis-
liss, however, until Mr. Larson had filed a 
squest for a final pretrial conference, sug-
esting that Mr. Larson had completed sub-
-antial trial preparation. If so, this would 
lgh against granting a motion to dismiss. 
As to the second Tansy factor, the majori-
r states that "the record shows Ms. Ohlan-
2r's counsel was actively and diligently mov-
ig forward with the case regardless of Ms. 
hlander's absence." Maj. Op. at 1538. A 
jview of the docket sheet, the only record of 
LS. Ohlander's litigation activity, undermines 
LIS assertion. The docket reveals that Ms. 
hlander waited almost a year after initiat-
g her action before filing her motion to 
smiss. During this time she did virtually 
>thing to affirmatively move her case along; 
stead, she merely responded through coun-
1 to Mr. Larson's efforts to ootain a con-
mpt order and the return of Julia to Utah. 
IUS, if anything, the limited record before 
supports the conclusion that Ms. Ohlander 
d not diligently prosecute this action. In-
ed, her conduct in absconding with Julia in 
)lanon of the court order belies a motiva-
>n to move her case forward. A remand 
>uld be useful on this point to explore 
lether she or her counsel made any efforts 
prosecute the case that do not now appear 
the record. 
The majority also opmes that because Ms. 
llander filed her motion to dismiss after 
r. Larson filed his application with the 
uted States Central Authority, "the timing 
Ms. Ohlander's motion could not constitute 
As noted on page* 1535-36. hu» filing in Swe-
ien was also mandated by ihe United States 
enabling legislation for the Hague Convention. 
excessive delay sufficient to legally prejudice 
Mr. Larson." Maj Op. at 1538. The logic of 
this statement is unclear. The filing of her 
motion in no way reflects her pre-filing dili-
gence m prosecuting her case once she re-
moved the child from the United States in 
violation of the district court's order. In-
deed, Mr. Larson's application with the Unit-
ed States Central Authority is absolutely ir-
relevant to an evaluation of whether Ms. 
Ohlander diligently pursued her separately 
filed action before the United States District 
Court. 
Finally, Ms. Ohlander did not provide a 
sufficient explanauon of her need for dismiss-
al. Ms. Ohlander gave three reasons for her 
Rule 41 motion, all derived from her fleeing 
with the child in violation of the district 
court order and her defiance of the district 
court a subsequent order that the child be 
returned to Utah. None of Ms. Ohlander's 
reasons warrant dismissal of her action. The 
majority forthngntly acknowledges that 
granting Ms. Ohlander's motion based on her 
first two reasons (that her petition was moot, 
and the child was no longer in the state of 
Utah) would create a perverse incentive for 
others to use United States courts to obtain 
physical control of their children and then 
unlawfully flee the United States. Thus, 
these reasons concededly provide no support 
for Ms. Ohlander's motion. 
The majority concludes that Ms. Ohlan-
der's third reason for dismissal, Mr. Larson's 
application to the Swedish Authority and his 
subsequent petition to the Swedish court, 
"provided the most persuasive reason to dis-
miss the United States district court pro-
ceeding." Maj. Op. at 1539. Punishing Mr. 
Larson for enlisting the aid of the only sover-
eignty with physical control of his child, how-
ever, ignores the practical and emotional di-
lemma with which Mr. Larson was faced. 
Litigating this matter in the United States 
could not provide Mr. Larson what he sought 
most: contact with his child. With his child 
in Sweden, albeit unlawfully, Mr. Larson had 
no real alternative but to seek Swedish assis-
tance.2 Otherwise, he wab faced with the 
devastating potential of a lingering loss of 
contact with his daughter. In addition, Mr. 
the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. 
which provides jurisdiction only to courts "in the 
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Larson had strategic litigation reasons for 
filing in Sweden when he did. The Hague 
Convention allows a parent who has fled even 
unlawfully with a child to assert a settled 
environment defense to a petition for return 
of a child if the petition is not filed within one 
year from the date the child is taken. Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction, Dec. 23, 1981, art. 12, 
51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10499 (1986). Mr. Lar-
son, therefore, had only one year to file if he 
wanted to prevent Ms. Ohlander from creat-
ing this defense by her unlawful flight. Un-
der these circumstances, Mr. Larson's filing 
in Sweden does not in any way compel the 
dismissal of the United States action. 
B. Additional Factors 
1. Appropriate Forum 
The majority maintains that Sweden was 
"the jurisdiction where the claims and de-
fenses of both Ms. Ohlander and Mr. Larson 
could be more fairly adjudicated." Maj. Op. 
at 1540. Specifically, the majority bases its 
preference for a Swedish adjudication on the 
presence of all the parties, including Julia, in 
Sweden, and its view that only in Sweden 
could Ms. Ohlander assert a "settled environ-
ment" defense. 
Placing weight on the presence of all par-
ties in the Swedish proceedings is inappropri-
ate. The precipitating reason for all parties' 
participation in the Swedish action was Ms. 
Ohlander's unlawful flight from the United 
States with Julia. Had Ms. Ohlander obeyed 
the district court's order and remained in 
Utah with Julia during the pendency of the 
United States proceedings, all parties would 
have been physically present for the United 
States proceedings. Instead, Ms. Ohlander 
chose to participate through counsel rather 
than to personally attend the United States 
trial. Her unlawful absence from the United 
States trial should not accrue to her benefit 
The majority's view that the settled envi-
ronment defense is available only in Sweden 
is similarly flawed. Article 12 of the Hague 
Convention creates the settled environment 
place where the child is located at the time the 
defense only when "a period of less than one 
year has elapsed from the date of the wrong-
ful removal or retention." Hague Conven-
tion, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499. Because 
Mr. Larson filed in Sweden within one year 
of Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia, the de-
fense was unavailable to Ms. Ohlander in the 
Swedish action. Similarly, if Mr. Larson had 
complied with the majority's ruling and filed 
in the United States within one year of Ju-
lia's removal, the defense would have been 
unavailable in the United States action. 
Furthermore, the majority erroneously as-
serts that denying Ms. Ohlander's motion to 
dismiss renders the settled environment de-
fense unavailable to her in the Utah action. 
The availability of the settled environment 
defense hinges on the filing and timing of 
Mr. Larson's own petition, not on whether 
Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss is granted 
or denied. 
2. Hague Convention Procedures 
The majority also states that Mr. Larson 
"chose to assert his claims in a court of 
another jurisdiction," Maj. Op. at 1539 (em-
phasis added), and that he would have been 
better served by filing a cross-petition in the 
United States District Court. Mr. Larson 
did not, however, have a choice where to file 
his petition once Ms. Ohlander took Julia to 
Sweden. Section 11603(b) of the Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act, the 
enabling legislation for the Hague Conven-
tion, provides: 
Any person seeking to initiate judicial pro-
ceedings under the Convention for the re-
turn of a child or for arrangements for 
organizing or securing the effective exer-
cise of rights of access to a child may do so 
by commencing a civil action by filing a 
petition for the relief sought in any court 
which has jurisdiction of such action and 
which is authorized to exercise its jurisdic-
tion in the place where the child is located 
at the time the petition is filed 
42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (emphasis added). At 
the time Mr. Larson filed his petition in 
January 1995, Julia was in Sweden, not Utah. 
At that point in time, the enabling legislation 
petition is filed." 42 U.S.C § 11603(b). 
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for the Hague Convention itself compelled 
Mr. Larson to file in Sweden because of 
Julia's presence there; it was the only nation 
with jurisdiction. 
Mr. Larson was careful to limit his Swed-
ish petition to the issue of Ms. Ohlander's 
taking of Julia in February 1994. The peti-
tion specifically informed the Swedish court 
)f the Hague Convention proceedings pend-
ng in the United States District Court for 
he District of Utah, and that Mr. Larson 
vas not intending to confer jurisdiction on 
he Swedish courts over the Hague Conven-
ion matters that were properly before the 
Jnited States District Court. Mr. Larson 
Jso requested that the Swedish courts await 
le district court's ruling on those matters. 
After the United States District Court en-
Bred its findings and conclusions, the United 
tates Central Authority notified Sweden of 
le United States ruling and asked that the 
wedish court limit its decision to the issue 
resented in Mr. Larson's petition. In a 
lemo to Sweden's Central Authority, a rep-
ssentative of the Office of Children's Issues 
ated: 
The only unresolved Hague Convention is-
sue for the Swedish courts to rule upon is 
the final resolution of Ms. Ohlander's most 
recent removal of the child from Utah on 
February 1, 1994. There is no doubt that 
Sweden is the '^requested State" for the 
adjudication of that issue, and that the 
Swedish courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
to make a final resolution of that matter in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
Hague Convention. Regarding that re-
moval, the U.S. Court, as a judicial author-
ity of the "requesting State," has made 
findings in accordance with Article 15 of 
the Convention, namely that the removal 
jvas in breach of Mr. Larson's actually-
ixercised rights of custody under Utah 
aw, and that Mr. Larson neither consent-
Before the Sweden Supreme Administrative 
oun created the international conflict in deci-
ons. the United States Central Authority en-
eated the Swedish courts: 
It is only through [ ] cooperation that the 
Hague Convention can successfully resolve 
these international conflicts over children, as it 
was designed to do. The present case offers a 
perfect illustration: A Hague Convention judg-
ment from Sweden which respects the prior 
v.: LARSON 1545L 
31 (lOthClr. 1997) 
ed to nor acquiesced in the removal. 
These findings, coupled with the judicially 
established fact that the child was habitu-
ally resident in Utah in November 1993, 
where she continued to live until the date 
of said removal, clearly establish that this 
was a new wrongful removal within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. 
Memorandum from Mr. James L. Schuler, 
Office of Children's Issues, United States 
Central Authority, to Central Authority of 
Sweden 2 (August 14,1995). 
The Hague Convention procedures thus 
not only required Mr. Larson to file in Swe-
den, where the child was located, but also 
allowed him to limit his petition to the one 
issue not before the United States District 
Court By following Hague Convention pro-
cedures and limiting his Swedish petition, he 
did not voluntarily create the potential for 
conflicting international decisions. 
3. Conflicting Decisions 
The majority's desire to avoid conflicting 
decisions of sovereign states is a worthy goal. 
Nevertheless, no law, national or internation-
al can be expected to resolve such conflicts 
in all cases, particularly cases involving a 
mother and father warring over their off-
spring. To base the outcome of this case on 
a potentially conflicting decision of Sweden is 
to unjustifiably abandon the rights of a Unit-
ed States citizen in the name of international 
comity. It is indeed ironic to do so when the 
substantive decision of the district court was 
not in conflict with any extant Swedish deci-
sion at the time of its promulgation. To the 
contrary, the Swedish decision favorable to 
Ms. Ohlander created the conflict in the deci-
sions of two sovereign nations. The Swedish 
decision was issued after and in conflict with 
the district court decision.3 See United 
States ex rel Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 
169-70 (3d Cir.1997) ("As a condition to hon-
oring a foreign country's judicial decrees, the 
Hague Convention judgment from the U.S. will 
put an end to the international jurisdictional 
competition between these States and will al-
low for a final and long-overdue custody adju-
dication, thus providing for the best interests 
of the child and finally allowing her to develop 
stable, secure family relationships, On the 
other hand, a Hague Convention judgment 
from Sweden which disregards the prior 
Hague Convention judgment from the United 
& 
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Court also requires reciprocity on the part of 
the foreign nation."); Remington Rand 
Corp.-DeL v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 
1260, 1273 (3d Cir.1987) (noting comity must 
be "two-way street" and reciprocity is consid-
eration of "extreme importance"). 
Because no Hague Convention decisions 
had been rendered by any Swedish courts at 
the time the district court ruled on the mo-
tion to dismiss, it is furthermore inappropri-
ate for this court to base its ruling on the 
conflict in decisions. See Maj. Op. at 1541 
("By failing to dismiss, the United States 
action we would allow to stand two conflict-
ing decisions regarding Julia's state of habit-
ual residence "). Instead, our review 
should be limited to those factors before the 
district court at the time it ruled. New 
factual matters should only be considered by 
the district court in the exercise of its discre-
tion on remand. 
U. Consideration of Ms. Ohiander's Con-
tempt 
The district court's consideration of Ms. 
Ohiander's contempt of court was entirely 
appropriate. Although the district court con-
sidered this to the exclusion of other relevant 
criteria, its actions in doing so are under-
standable, if not correct. Ms. Ohlander 
availed herself of the services of the district 
court to obtain temporary custody of the 
child.' She then fled this country in direct 
States would only perpetuate and escalate the 
already intolerable conflict, as the parties 
would then possess contradictory Hague Con-
vention judgments in their favor from their 
respective States, which would be the most 
unstable and insecure situation imaginable. 
Such a situation would guarantee that which-
ever parent has possession of the child would 
not dare allow the other parent access to the 
child, and the parent without possession of the 
child would have no option but to resort to 
force in order to have anv contact with the 
child. 
Memo from Mr. James L. Schuler, Office of 
Children's Issues, to Central Authority of Sweden 
2-3 (August 14. 1995). 
k Rule 41(a)(2) provides: "If a counterclaim has 
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service 
upon the defendant of the plaintiffs motion to 
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against 
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim 
can remain pending for independent adjudica-
tion bv the court-" Fed.RXiv.P. 41(a)(2). 
violation of the very order by which she 
obtained physical control of the child. Her 
conduct can neither be ignored nor reward-
ed. Although this should not control the 
district court's decision to the exclusion ->f 
other governing factors, it may fairly be giv-
en significant weight in the court's overall 
analysis. 
C. Treatment of Larson's Defenses is 
Counterclaims 
The majority rejects Mr. Larson's request 
that his response to Ms. Ohiander's petition 
be treated as a counterclaim or, for Hague 
Convention purposes, a petition.4 Maj. Op. 
at 1538-39. Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure allows a court to treat a 
defense as a counterclaim, "if justice so re-
quires." In Mr. Larson's response to Ms 
Ohiander's petition, he alleges that the Unit-
ed States was, and at all times had been, the 
country of Julia's habitual residence as de-
fined under the Hague Convention, and 
prays for his daughter's return to his physi-
cal care and control. The essence of Mr. 
Larson's response is generally equivalent to 
the relief he would request were he to fUe his 
own formal Hague Convention petition.5 
Treating Mr. Larson's response as a counter-
claim would place the.respondent's removal 
of the child and any proper settled environ-
ment defense before the district court, thus 
eradicating the majority's concern that such 
issues could not be decided without Mr. Lar-
5. For example. Ms. Ohiander's petition before 
the district court requested the following relief: 
Petitioner requests that the child be immedi-
ately returned to her custody, and that she be 
permitted to return to Sweden, which is the 
country of habitual residence of both Petitioner 
and the child, and that temporarily, pending 
further hearing on this Petition, she be permit-
ted to retain custody of the child within the 
jurisdiction of this Court pending this Court's 
final determination. 
Petition for Return of Child to Petitioner at 4; 
Mr. Larson alleged substantially the same mat-
ters in his defenses. Justice would not be served 
by requiring Mr. Larson to file a separate plead-
ing, formally designated as a counterclaim, alleg-
ing the very matters already contained in his 
defenses. To do so honors form over substance 
in an emotionally charged setting where a parent 
seeks to reestablish contact with his child. 
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Clie a* 114 F.3d 1347 {Fed. Or. 1997) 
n's own petition in the district court. See 
ague Convention, arts. 3 & 12, 51 Fed.Reg. 
10,498-10,499; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b), (e). 
light of Rule 41(a)(2) factors and the 
igue Convention's objective of protecting 
Idren from the law of "grab and run," 
aj. Op. at 1534-35), the interests of justice 
j indeed served by construing Mr. Lar-
i's response as a counterclaim. 
). Conclusion 
'he majority has reversed the district 
rt for refusing to dismiss Ms. Ohlander's 
tion on the basis of her contempt of court 
instead has ruled de novo that Ms. Ohl-
er's motion should have been granted, 
doing so, the majority has considered 
3 not before the district court at the time 
iled. It has further allowed those very 
» (ie.> conflicting international decisions) 
mtrol the outcome of this appeal, to the 
ision of other governing criteria. 
ds case should be remanded to the dis-
court for full consideration of Rule 
(2) criteria.6 The trial court failed to 
der critical factors governing Ms. Ohlan-
motion. Consequently, the record of 
factors is incomplete. An appellate 
may decide a matter rather than re-
if the underlying facts are undisputed 
idicial economy and efficiency would be 
ired thereby. Park County Resource 
ril Inc. v. United States Dept ofAgric, 
'.2d 609, 617-18 (10th Cir.1987), aver-
on other grounds by Village of Los 
IOS de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 
>73 (10th Cir.1992). Such is not the 
ere. A remand is required when the 
needs further development. See 
/ v. McCormick 40 F.3d 337, 341 (10th 
M) (remanding when record inade-
to evaluate trial court's consideration 
ired criteria). 
lis case, the record is simply insufH-
> enable this court to apply adequately 
al criteria governing Rule 41(a)(2) mo-
) dismiss. In addition, the majority 
incongruous for this court to say that Rule 
Lions are addressed to the sound discretion 
tnal court and yet. rather than remand, 
novo that trial court discretion as a mat-
aw could only result in dismissal. Beyond 
:ongruity. ruling de novo that Ms. Ohlan-
lule 41 motion should be granted as a 
has set forth a set of novel factors it believes 
must be evaluated in this case. The trial 
court had absolutely no notice that consider-
ation of such factors would be required in 
this case. If the majority is going to require 
a trial court to consider novel factors, that 
court should be given an opportunity to exer-
cise its discretion, address those factors on 
remand and develop a meaningful record. 
At that time, the district court could carefully 
consider the mandate of the Convention's 
Article 12 which provides that a forum may 
stay or dismiss a Hague Convention pro-
ceeding when the subject child has been tak-
en to another State. Hague Convention, art. 
12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10,499. 
In the context of this case, an appellate 
ruling as a matter of law is inappropriate. I 
would reverse and remand for further pro-
ceedings on Ms. Ohlander's Rule 41 motion 
to dismiss. 
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Owner of exclusive right to enforce pat-
ent for process for making granules of con-
matter of law assumes that the district court's 
discretionary ruling upon remand would be deni-
al of the motion, rather than granting the motion 
or even staying the action, an alternative express-
ly contemplated by the Hague Convention. 
Hague Convention, art. 12. 51 Fed.Reg. at 10,-
499. 
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